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Comments
COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE MARYLAND ERA
Comparable worth is a remedy for eliminating wage disparities
that are based on sex or race. Advocates see it as an appropriate
and expeditious, if only partial, solution to the continuing gap in
wages between women and men. Opponents see it as an unwork-
able and expensive intervention into the market-based wage-setting
process. In fact, it is neither a panacea for wage discrimination nor
a threat to the economic structure of the labor market. As with
other ideas that have challenged accepted premises, however, it has
aroused controversy since its inception. Because it requires a re-
examination of the traditional methods ofjob evaluation within dis-
crete employment systems in order to remove latent discriminatory
influences in the wage-setting process, it has met resistance from
those quarters of government and commerce that view the change
as unnecessary and costly.
Maryland is no exception. Responsible authorities have con-
sistently rejected the concept of comparable worth. The remedy not
only urges intervention into the market to establish wages on a
more equitable basis, but also seeks to abolish actual sex-based
wage discrimination. Under the Maryland Equal Rights Amend-
ment (ERA), this is a legal duty.
This comment premises that the State's failure to remedy gen-
der-based wage disparities documented in a recent study of the
merit system violates the Maryland ERA. Part I discusses the theory
of comparable worth and the extent to which it has been imple-
mented in states and municipalities across the United States. Part II
analyzes the 1985 comparable worth study of the Maryland merit
system, evaluates its conclusions and reviews state action on its rec-
ommendations following the study. Part III discusses state courts as
alternate forums for litigation of sex-based wage discrimination
cases. Part IV reviews the history of the Maryland ERA, including
the latest standard of review by Maryland courts, and proposes ar-
guments for applying the protection of the ERA to the victims of the
state's sex-based wage discrimination.
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I. COMPARABLE WORTH-BACKGROUND
A. The Wage Gap and Pink Collar Ghettos
The wage gap between women and men is well known: on the
average, women who work year-round, full-time jobs earn approxi-
mately sixty-four cents for every dollar paid men, regardless of the
level of education or work experience.' The wage gap has persisted
for a number of reasons. Before passage of the federal Equal Pay
Act of 1963 (EPA),2 discrimination in pay between women and men
who performed the same jobs was legal. The EPA addressed the
issue, mandating equal pay for equal work. Because the majority of
working women do not hold the same categories of jobs as men,3
however, the protection gained from pay comparisons with equal
jobs envisioned by the EPA did not reach them.
This occupational segregation has been blamed for the thirty-
five to forty percent wage gap between women and men.4 The fact
that women historically have been clustered in "pink collar ghet-
tos' 5 has perpetuated depressed wages for working women.6 As a
1. National Comm. on Pay Equity, Briefing Paper on the Wage Gap 3 (Sept. 18,
1987) (citing United States Dep't of Commerce, Census Bureau, Current Population
Reports, Consumer Income, Series P-60, Nos. 150, 154 & 157 (1984, 1985 & 1986,
respectively) (No. 157 noting statistics for 1986)). The wage gap has hovered around
60% since 1955, going as low as 57% in 1973 and 1974, and as high as 64% in 1955 and
1957 and in 1983 and 1984. Id. at 2.
In the federal government, full-time, year-round working women earn 63 cents for
every dollar paid men; in state and local governments, they earn 71 cents for every dol-
lar earned by men; and in the private sector, full-time, year-round working women earn
56 cents for every dollar earned by men. NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, THE WAGE
GAP: MYTHS AND FACTS 2 (1983) (citing UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPU-
LATION REPORTS, SERIES P-60, No. 132, TABLE 58 (1981) [hereinafter MYTHS AND FACTS]
(relying on 1980 statistics)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) [hereinafter EPA].
3. Fifty-two percent of working women work in two of the Department of Labor's
twelve categories of major occupations: clerical work and service work other than pri-
vate household workers. Myths and Facts, supra note 1, at 5. Of the 427 subcategories
of the 12 major occupations, half of all working women are concentrated in only 20.
More than half of all working women worked in jobs which were 75% female in 1982;
22% worked in jobs which were 95% female. Id.
4. See generally, Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VHI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979); COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION & ANALYSIS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WVORK, AND WAGES:
EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE (1981) [hereinafter NAS STUDY]; H. AARON & C.
LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY (1986). Cf NATIONAL RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK-SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (1985), reported in
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 293, at A-7, A-8 (Dec. 12, 1985) [hereinafter SEX SEGREGA-
TION ON THE JOB] ("persistent" wage gap is the most serious consequence of occupa-
tional segregation); MYTHS AND FACTS, supra note 1.
5. This term denotes the limited range of jobs where women traditionally have
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result, jobs largely held by women tend to be underpaid.7 The use
of gender and gender-based characteristics must be eliminated in
the job evaluation process to remedy the existing pay inequities.
B. Job Evaluation and Undervaluation
Comparable worth theory assumes that undervaluation of fe-
male-dominated jobs is the product ofjob evaluation processes that
rely on gender as a factor in evaluating jobs for purposes of setting
pay. Thus, jobs that usuafly are held by men are evaluated more
highly for skills and effort and, consequently, are assigned higher
pay. In the same evaluation process, jobs that usually are held by
women are evaluated less highly and are assigned lewer pay. For
example, job evaluation systems tend to recognize physical effort
more readily in male-dominated occupational classes than in female-
dominated jobs. More weight is assigned to physical effort than to
back or eye strain from extended work in front of a video display
terminal. Consequently, the male-dominated job classes are rated
been concentrated,jobs that are generally lowpaid and offer litde, if any, opportunity for
advancement.
6. Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 415-57; NAS STUDY, supra note 4, at 56-66; AARON &
LOUGY, supra note 4, at 42. It is in the labor market, according to comparable worth
advocates and other observers, where the undervaluation of women's work is perpetu-
ated. In an ideal market, the depressed wages of women's jobs, it would seem, should
discourage women from seeking and accepting low-paying jobs; that is the central argu-
ment of opponents of comparable worth. See, e.g., Pay Equity Bill: Hearing on H.B. 1067
Before the House Appropriations Comm., 1987 Sess. (Mar. 9, 1987) (testimony of the Cham-
ber of Commerce); COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (R. Livernash ed.
1980). But that is not what happens in the real world. In the real world, women are
consigned to pink collar ghetto jobs, more often than not for reasons other than their
own preference. Sex Segregation on the Job, supra note 4, at A-7. According to the
National Research Council, hiring and training practices (such as recruitment systems
based on worker referrals or on male-dominated settings such as vocational education
schools or the military, requirements for nonessential training or credentials that wo-
men often lack, and veterans' preferences), plus social stereotypes (such as what jobs are
appropriate for women and for men, and stereotypical characteristics of women and
men) constitute barriers which limit women's opportunities to a narrow set of alterna-
tives. Id. at A-7 to -8.
7. NAS STUDY, supra note 4, at 93 ("[Ilt is also true in many instances that jobs held
mainly by women and minorities pay less at least in part because they are held mainly by
women and minorities. First, the differentials in average pay for jobs held mainly by
women and those held mainly by men persist when the characteristics ofjobs thought to
affect their value and the characteristics of workers thought to affect their productivity
are held constant. Second, prior to the legislation of the last two decades, differentials
in pay for men and women and for minorities and non-minorities were often acceptable
and were, in fact, prevalent. The traditio n embodied in such practices was built into
wage structures, and its effects continue to influence these structures. Finally, at the
level of the specific firm, several studies show that women's jobs are paid less on the
average than men's jobs with the same scores derived from job evaluation plans.").
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more highly and their pay set at higher levels. In other instances,
manual dexterity or person-to-person contact may be underrated in
traditionally female-dominated jobs, resulting in lower pay.
Gender can be eliminated as a factor in the job evaluation pro-
cess by evaluating jobs based on their value to the employer. The
point factor evaluation system is one method of job evaluation
under comparable worth. This methodology rates each job within a
discrete employment system (i.e., each employer adopts its own
comparable worth evaluation system) by first assigning points (or
values) to job factors. Points usually are assigned to skill, effort, re-
sponsibility and working conditions. The point values of the job are
totalled and compared with the total point ratings for other jobs.
All jobs whose values are equal should then receive the same rate of
pay. Thus, jobs are evaluated according to those factors the em-
ployer values, and rates of pay are set according to the job values,
rather than the sex of the particular person holding the job or the
gender usually associated with the job.
Of course, the rate of pay that is established for the jobs that
are evaluated equally is decided by the employer-a decision that is
independent of the comparable worth theory and the point factor
evaluation methodology. Thus, the employer may wish to set a low
level of pay for all jobs rated at a certain level (i.e., all clericals and
all maintenance engineers, if their jobs are rated equally in point
value) so long as the rate of pay is the same for all the equally rated
jobs. It may be an economically unwise decision if the market rate is
higher, or it may reflect a low estimation of the status of the job, but
the decision itself would not be based on gender discrimination per
se if the evaluation process excludes gender as a factor.
Also, this comparable worth job evaluation process would take
place within discrete employer systems. Comparable worth does
not contemplate a national wage-setting job evaluation mechanism.
In fact, to conduct a comparable worth job evaluation, the employer
first must determine what criteria and values it wants for all of its
own jobs. This determination is unique to each employer. The cri-
teria and values then become the basis for comparison among all the
jobs. Advocates believe that using comparable worth in job evalua-
tions will help achieve pay equity in the myriad of unique employ-
ment systems in the country. 8
8. Pay equity and comparable worth frequently are used interchangeably in this
context, although in reality comparable worth is a strategy-one of several, including
equal pay for equal work and efforts to encourage women to enter nontraditional jobs-
which is designed to achieve pay equity.
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Typically, the process of implementing comparable worth be-
gins with a study of an employment system. Such a study may sur-
vey selected jobs, rate the jobs according to a set of factors selected
by the employer, adapt salaries for the jobs according to a scale of
values and corresponding salaries selected by the employer, and
then compare the salaries of the surveyed jobs with their existing
salaries. The gap in the salaries determines the extent of undervalu-
ation. Not surprisingly, the female-dominated jobs usually are un-
dervalued as compared to the male-dominated jobs.
Action then should be taken to remedy the documented under-
valuation. Some jurisdictions have instituted comparable worth pay
increases.9 Other jurisdictions have begun with pay equity policies,
following policymaking with a gradual introduction of comparable
worth job evaluation of the entire system. Pay equity increases can
be implemented in one-time dramatic raises or in gradual fashion.
Re-evaluation of jobs can be accomplished through point factor
methods or through a number of other methods available in the
field of personnel systems.
C. Extent of Implementation of Comparable Worth Nationwide
Because women work in the public sector in disproportionate
numbers,"° it is logical and appropriate to address comparable
worth in that sector first. Ten states have pay equity or comparable
worth policies which, either through legislation, executive order, ad-
ministrative policy or other pronouncement, explicitly state a com-
pensation goal of equal pay for work of comparable worth or value
for state employees." Twenty states have statutes which include
some kind of comparable worth language.'"
Fourteen states have implemented comparable worth pay in-
creases for their state employees to address pay inequities in female-
dominated or race-dominated job classifications. 3 .Twenty states
9. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
10. In 1984, 51% of publicsector jobs were filled by women. AARON & LOUGY, supra
note 4, at 38-39.
11. These states include Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEF-
ING REPORT, PAY EQuITY: STATUS OF STATE ACTIVITIES 15 (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT] (compiling responses by 48 of 50 states-Alabama and Pennsylvania did not
respond-to GAO questionnaires on pay equity).
12. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, PAY EQUITY AND.COMPARABLE WORTH 1 (1984)
[hereinafter BNA SPECIAL REPORT].
13. The states are Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin. NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQuiTY, STATE UPDATE (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter
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conducted a comparable worth job evaluation study-a study of the
state civil service classification and compensation system that evalu-
ates all job classes using comparable worth methodology and deter-
mines, once the job values are thus held constant, the extent of
wage disparities between male-dominated and female-dominated
classes.' 4 Eight additional states have collected data on gender-
based pay differences and/or occupational segregation among state
employees. 15
Thirty-seven municipalities have acted under comparable worth.
considerations as of December 1987.16 In 1981 city workers in San
Jose, California, and Colorado Springs, Colorado, negotiated con-
tracts which included comparable worth pay increases. 17 In April
1985, over then-Mayor Diane Feinstein's veto, the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors appropriated funds for one-time comparable
worth pay increases for city employees in undervalued female-domi-
nated and minority-dominated jobs.'" The voters of San Francisco
then institutionalized comparable worth by authorizing pay equity
wage increases after annual surveys of female-dominated and mi-
nority-dominated job classes in a city charter amendment vote in
November 1986.1' Twenty-one cities and counties in California
STATE UPDATE] (listing 12 states); NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY E.urrY, PAY EquxTY NEWS
Nomxs, .at 1, 6 (Summer 1986) [hereinafter PAY Equrrv NEWS NoTEs] (adding Florida
and Vermont to the April count).
There are many varieties of comparable worth pay increases: for example, the un-
dervalued (usually female-dominated) jobs can be upgraded in pay up to their counter-
part (usually male-dominated) jobs of equal value; the undervalued jobs can be brought
up to a mean between all male-dominated and all female-dominated jobs; or the pay
increase can split the difference between the means of the two categories. The National
Committee for Pay Equity defines implementation of increases as action taken by the
state legislature or the governor's office to appropriate funds. See STATE UPDATE, supra,
at 1. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 23, 26 (summarizing states' responses to
questionnaire on comparable worth research and implementation).
14. The states are Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. GAO REPORT, supra
note 11, at 15 (listing under study "2" those states that have implemented "a job con-
tent pay equity study"). The pay equity studies compared the pay of male and female
job classes with comparable job evaluation scores.
15. The states are California, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, and North Carolina. Id. (listing those states under study "I" of the chart).
16. NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, SURVEY OF LOCAL PAY EQUITY ACTIVITY (Dec.
1987) [hereinafter SURVEY] (listing counties, cities, and school districts involved in pay
equity activities).
17. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE 34-37 (Oct. 30, 1981).
18. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 82, at A-4 (Apr. 29, 1985).
19. The mayor has authority to veto any pay equity wage adjustment, either' in its
entirety or in part. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 216, at A-7 (Nov. 7, 1986).
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have made pay equity adjustments for their employees.2 ° Minnesota
requires pay equity implementation at the state and local level, and
seventy-nine percent of the cities and eighty percent of the counties
in that state have adjusted employees' salaries accordingly. 2 The
City of Chicago in 1986 negotiated a comparable worth raise in re-
turn for a withdrawal of charges of discrimination filed by the city
employees union.22 In Washington, Oregon, and Delaware em-
ployee unions have negotiated pay equity increases for municipal
and county employees.23 Ixi addition, cities and counties in Con-
necticut, Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and Wis-
consin have implemented pay equity increases for their
employees.24
II. COMPARABLE WORTH AcTIVITIES IN MARYLAND
A. Comparable Worth Study of the Maryland Merit System
The State of Maryland first addressed the issue of comparable
worth in a study of its merit classification system. Booz-Allen &
Hamilton, Inc. and Hallcrest-Craver Associates, Inc. commenced
the Maryland Comparable Worth Study (the Study) in August 1984.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton presented its draft report to the Governor's
Commission on Compensation and Personnel Policies (Governor's
Commission) on November 25, 1985.25 The final report was
presented on February 26, 1986.26 The Study was the outgrowth of
a two-year effort by a number of advocates for pay equity, led by the
Maryland Commission for Women, to convince the Governor's
Commission to consider comparable worth as a principal compo-
nent of internal equity within the state merit classification system.27
20. SURVEY, supra note 16.
21. Id.
22. 24 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1158, at 478 (Apr. 7, 1986).
23. SURVEY, supra note 16.
24. Id.
25. See Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. & Hallcrest-Craver Assoc., Draft Report to the
Governor's Comm'n on Compensation and Personnel Policies, The State of Maryland
Comparable Worth Study (Nov. 8, 1985) [hereinafter Draft Report].
26. BOoz-AI.LEN & HAMILTON, INC. & HALLCREST-CRAVER Assoc., FINAL REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON COMPENSATION AND PERSONNEL POLICIES, THE STATE OF
IMARYI.AND COMPARABLE WN7ORTH STUDY (Feb. 26. 1986) [hereinafter Study].
27. Maryland Comm'n for Women, Fact Sheet, Pay Equity Activities in Maryland
(Oct. 22, 1985) (unpublished). The Comparable Worth Committee of the Maryland
Commission for Women (the Committee) first convened in January 1982, chaired by
Barbara 0. Kreamer, Delegate to the Maryland General Assembly. Pay equity advocates
who joined the Commissioners of the Maryland Commission for Women on the Com-
mittee included representatives of the National Organization for Women (Marvland
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1. Study Methodology.-The Study attempted to provide infor-
mation on the extent of undervaluation of female-dominated classes
in the State's current job classification system, proposed a classifica-
tion system, and recommended alternatives to correct any underval-
uation found.2" In addition, the Study addressed the concentration
of women in low-paying jobs and the usefulness of incorporating
labor market data into the State's pay-setting process.29
In order to examine the extent of undervaluation of female-
dominated classes, the Study first compared the state classification
system with other job evaluation systems 0 and discussed job value
assessment through a literature review.3 ' The Study then compared
jobs in selected female-dominated and male-dominated classes.3 2
The consultants analyzed the current and proposed compensation
systems under two separate factor evaluation systems,33 and then
Chapter), the American Association of University Women (Maryland Chapter), the Wo-
men's Law Center, Inc., the Maryland Commission on Human Relations, the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the Maryland Classified Employ-
ees Association (MCEA), the Baltimore 9-to-5 Organization, the League of Women Vot-
ers, and the Maryland Nurses Association. The Committee presented testimony before
the Governor's Commission on Compensation and Personnel Policies (Governor's
Commission) and advocated consideration of comparable worth in the Commission's
review of the merit pay system. While considering a new compensation and classifica-
tion system (the proposed system) presented to it by a consulting firm, the Commission,
in response to a request by the Committee, decided to conduct a comparable worth
study of both the existing state system and the proposed system. The decision was an-
nounced at the March 31, 1983 meeting of the Commission. Id.
28. Study, supra note 26, at 1-3. As of June 30, 1986, there were approximately
90,000 positions in the merit system, but only 54,623 positions budgeted in the state
workforce were under Department of Personnel (DOP) salary-setting control. Eleven
thousand seven hundred thirty-five positions were budgeted under the University of
Man land, which has independent salary-setting control. Another approximately 24,000
positions were categorized under other independent salary-setting agencies (e.g., tempo-
rary and contractual employees, Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund employees) not
budgeted under the DOP. SPECIAL OVERSIGHT SUBCOMM. ON PERSONNEL, APPROPRIA-
TIONS COMM., QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, 1987 Sess. (In-
terim), at Att. 1 (Sept. 1, 1987) [hereinafter DOP RESPONSE].
29. Study, supra note 26, at 1-3.
30. The Study developed background information on the comparable worth exper-
iences of Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Washing-
ton and described the job evaluation systems of Maryland's counties and major cities.
Id. at 11-3 to -32.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61 for a discussion of the shortcomings of
this review.
32. Study, supra note 26, at IV-9. The sample of classes included 241 male-domi-
nated classes and 144 female-dominated classes. Most (63%) had 20 or more incum-
bents. In the classes with fewer than 20 incumbents, the male-dominated classes
outnumbered the female-dominated classes by about 2-1/2 to 1, indicating a prolifera-
tion of small classes of jobs for male employees. Id.
33. Id. at IV-9 to -10. A total of 385 gender-dominated job classes were analyzed,
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analyzed the effects of adjustments in pay schedules as a result of a
targeted pay increase by the State. Disparities in pay between fe-
male-dominated and male-dominated jobs were documented. The
consultants then modified their results by adjusting salaries accord-
ing to weekly work hours.3 4 The consultants also conducted a ran-
dom sample poll of women occupying lower-paying positions in an
attempt to survey the reasons why female employees applied for,
accepted, and stayed in jobs that were concentrated in the lower
ranks of the merit system.35
2. Study Conclusions.-After nineteen months of reviewing ac-
tivities in other jurisdictions, developing methodology, gathering
data and analyzing the results, the Study reached the following five
conclusions:
- Based upon the job-content measures of the [two]
factor evaluation systems, and using actual pay levels, the
State of Maryland's current pay practices undervalue female-
dominated classes compared to male-dominated classes.
- The Annual Salary Review (ASR) process for Fis-
cal Year (FY) 1986 appears to have narrowed the difference
between male and female pay lines for the current system
but has not eliminated it.
- When current salary levels are adjusted to stand-
ardize the length of the work-week for all classes, analyses
show slight if any statistically significant difference between
salaries of male- and female-dominated classes.
comprising approximately 59% of state employees. Id. at IV-9. Gender-dominated
classes were defined as those whose incumbents were 70% or more female or male. Id.
at D-I.
The two evaluation systems used to analyze the classes were the Quantitative Eval-
uation System and theJacobs System. Id. at IV-5. Both systems are point factor systems
that evaluate job classes on the. basis of work content only; they are well established,
have been used by governmental organizations, and have produced results acceptable to
both managers and employees in previous studies.
The Quantitative Evaluation System was modified to incorporate the job values
reflected in a cross-section of state jobs. Thejob values were determined by consensus
between representatives of state agencies, two employee associations, the Maryland
Commission on Women, and the Maryland Commission on Human Relations. Defini-
tions of levels were worked out and point scales were set to correspond to the estab-
lished values. The modified system was renamed the Maryland Quantitative Evaluation
System (MQES). The MQES "represent[ed] the combined views of this group on what
the State considers important to value in its jobs, and how much weight or points should
be attached to each factor." Id. at IV-6.
34. Study, supra note 26, at IV-1 to -49.
35. Questionnaires were sent to 200 women and 200 men who were randomly se-
lected from categories of jobs paying $15,000 or less per annum. Id. at VI-4.
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- The analysis of the proposed system also yields re-
sults indicating undervaluation of female-dominated
classes compared to male-dominated classes.
- The current pay practices are only indirectly re-
lated to work content value of the classes (at least as mea-
sured by the [two] systems), resulting in considerable
dispersion and under- and overvaluation of individual
classes.36
a. Undervaluation of Female-DominatedJobs.-The State's current
compensation system uses four primary job evaluation systems to
set pay for most of its classified jobs.3' The job classes were se-
lected from all job categories of the current classification system be-
cause the sole criterion for selection was that the incumbents in the
class be seventy percent or more female or male."8 The classes
within the current and proposed evaluation systems were tested by
evaluating them anew under the Study's two separate point factor
evaluation systems.3 1 This provided the raw data for the consult-
ant's analysis.
The Study applied the statistical tools of scatter diagrams and
regression lines to plot the dispersion of the newly evaluated posi-
tions in terms of their evaluation points and salaries. The Study
showed graphically the difference between the mean salary line of
female-dominated classes and the mean salary line of male-domi-
nated classes.
The Study concluded that when the two evaluation systems
36. Id. at IV-47 (emphasis in original).
37. Completed Questionnaire Submitted by the State of Maryland in Response to
the U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Survey of States' Pay Equity Activities 2-3 (1986) [here-
inafter Questionnaire]. Jobs described as executive within the classified system, or 3%
of all classified positions, are compared by ranking them in terms of difficulty and rank-
ordering them in a hierarchy. The same system is used for physicians. Administrative,
managerial, professional, and technical jobs in the State's classification system, 52% of
all classified positions, are evaluated under the factor comparison system. This system
first ranks certain key jobs ("whole jobs") on the basis of selected factors and then deter-
mines the value of all the other jobs by their relation to the key jobs. As to clerical and
secretarial positions, or 22% of all classified positions, it is not clear which system is
used. Id. The Study stated that alljobs under the current classification system are evalu-
ated by the "whole job technique." Study, supra note 26, at V-6, -22. The State's re-
sponse to the GAO survey of state pay equity activities, however, stated that a point
factor system is used for clerical and secretarial positions. Questionnaire at 2. Cf GAO
REPORT, supra note 11. Giving preference to the consultants' determinations, it will be
presumed that clerical and secretarial positions are evaluated under the factor compari-
son method using the whole job technique.
38. Study, supra note 26, at IV-8.
39. Id. at IV-I to -49.
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were applied to the selected classes in order to eliminate gender as a
factor in the setting of pay, the resulting charts demonstrated a
"consistent pattern of undervaluation of female-dominated
classes."' 40 The Study concluded that the extent of undervaluation
of female-dominated classes in the current and proposed pay sys-
tems ranged from three percent to twenty percent.41
b. Use of Market Data.-Labor market data is used by the State
both in making periodic across-the-board salary adjustments and in
regrading individual classes (usually because of recruitment and re-
tention problems) in the Annual Salary Review (ASR) process. 42
The Study concluded that the State inevitably changes the relative
internal worth of job classes based on the influences of the market
when it utilizes the ASR process to integrate market data into the
pay system.43 The market influences tend to undervalue female-
dominated work. Because the ASR process is used currently to re-
grade individual classes, "the potential for pay equity problems in-
creases." 4 4 Similarly, when labor market considerations are relied
upon for periodic structural adjustments of Maryland's "Standard
Salary Schedule," salary levels tend to vary for jobs of equal value
based on a work content evaluation system.4 5 Indeed, the Study
warned that the use of separate pay plans for different categories of
employees also can lead to further undervaluation of female-domi-
nated jobs because salary rates in the labor market for female-domi-
nated work sometimes are lower than for male dominated work of
40. Id. at IV-32. The proposed system, which has not been adopted, showed after
re-evaluation that female-dominated classes "would be paid significantly less than the
male-dominated classes at the lower end of thejob evaluation scores, while at the upper
end of the scale there would be less difference in pay treatment." Id. at IV-45.
41. The consultants concluded that the extent of disparity in the current system
ranged from 0% to 9%, id. at IV-47, but the source of these figures is not clear. Presum-
ably, the percentages are the range of differences between the female and male regres-
sion lines under the two evaluation systems. Yet the table which supports the
consultants' textual conclusion shows, instead of a range of from 0% to 9%, a range of
from 3% to 20% in 1985. Id. at IV-48. To be sure, at the bottom of the same page,
when discussing undervaluation of female-dominated jobs under the proposed system,
the consultants indicate a range of undervaluation of from 2% to 12%, and that is in-
deed the range shown on the table supporting the text. Id. Therefore, one can presume
that the consultants mistakenly referred to 0% to 9%, when they should have used 3%
to 20% as the correct range of disparity. The consultants discovered a 0% to 18%
undervaluation range for 1986. The validity of this later finding, however, is critiqued
herein.
42. Study, supra note 26, at V-7.
43. Id. at V-I.
44. Id.
45. Id. at V-17.
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equivalent.job content value.46
c. Job Segregation.-The Study concluded that women are dis-
proportionally concentrated in the low-paying positions of the state
compensation system. Seventy percent of the State's employees in
jobs in the $0 to $15,000 salary range are women. In all, 44.3 per-
cent of all salaried female employees earn less than $15,000 per
year.47 By contrast, the State's male employees are concentrated in
the high-paying positions, that is, sixty-five percent of the salaried
employees in the $21,100 or more range are male. 48 Low-paying
positions dominated by women include the office/clerical, health
care, human services, and housekeeping categories.4 9
Although the consultants recognized important limitations on
their ability to deduce the causes for job segregation of women in
the current state classification system, the Study nevertheless con-
cluded that one major cause for the concentration is that women
apply for and accept low-paid, dead-end positions in higher percent-
ages than men.5 0 The Study showed that experience requirements
had the largest effect (sixty-four percent) on the disqualification of
women applicants. For men, on the other hand, the disqualification
most often was based on licensing or certification requirements
(forty percent) or education (thirty percent).5' Finally, the Study
showed that lack of time in the workforce and career interruptions
were not factors in explaining the concentration of women in low-
paying jobs.52
The consultants tested for a correlation between the concentra-
tion of women in low-paying job classifications in the merit system
and the undervaluation of female-dominated job classifications by
testing for female concentration in jobs before and after re-evalua-
tion under two comparable worth evaluation systems used in the
Study.53 They found that the concentration of women in the lowest-
paying third of the merit system job classifications persisted after
the re-evaluation of the jobs on the basis of job content value.54
The Study concluded that "the concentration of females in lower-
46. Study, supra note 26, at V-13.
47. Id. at VI-6.
48. Id.
49. Id. at VI-13 (Exh. VI-3).
50. Study, supra note 26, at VI-19.
51. Id. at VI-24.
52. Id. at VI-31, V-33.
53. Id. at VI-33 to -37.
54. Study, supra note 26, at VI-35.
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paying jobs is not to any large extent due to undervaluation of the
work itself."5 -
3. Analysis of the Study.-The Comparable Worth Study docu-
mented existing gender-based wage discrepancies in the merit sys-
tem that ranged from three percent to twenty percent. The
consultants attempted to temper the effect of the Study's conclu-
sions by giving prominence to a seemingly moderating effect of a
salary increase in 1986 targeted at undervalued female-dominated
jobs and to the impact of an adjustment in calculations by con-
forming weekly work hours among job classifications. In the final
analysis, however, the gender-based wage discrepancies are neither
mitigated nor offset by the pay raise or the adjusted workweek. This
comment will argue that the State has failed to remedy the gender-
based discrimination in wages that is evidenced by the Study's find-
ings, thus violating Maryland's ERA.56
The Study also recognized that reliance on the market by the'
State to restructure and reclassify several classifications imports
wage discrepancies into the reclassification process. The State may
not rely on a market which imports gender-based discrepancies as
an excuse for retaining the existing evaluation systems. Such reli-
ance becomes evidence of intent to perpetuate documented existing
gender-based wage discrepancies. The Study's random survey of
women employees in the low-paying jobs of the merit system con-
cluded that the women had merely chosen their own segregation.
This conclusion, however, did not analyze important factors that in-
fluence women's decisions in selecting jobs.
Before analyzing the Study's conclusions, however, a discussion
is merited on the review conducted by the consultants of various job
evaluation methodologies, a review that help set the stage for its
evaluation of salary data.
a. Survey of Job Evaluation Methodologies.-Jobs held predomi-
nantly by women often are evaluated under the shadow of uncon-
scious bias or under the lingering effect of discriminatory market
wage patterns that were set when discrimination was not illegal.5 7
Unconscious bias can make male-dominated or nonminority-domi-
55. Id. at VI-37.
56. This topic is covered more fully in Part IV of this comment.
57. Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 434-57; NAS STUDY, supra note 4, at 56-66; AARON &
LouGY, supra note 4, at 15, 42. The following discussion of unconscious or intentional
bias in the job evaluation process is based primarily on the Blumrosen article and the
NAS Study.
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nated jobs seem more difficult or can underestimate the difficulty of
jobs predominantly held by women or blacks. Stereotypes can influ-
ence job qualifications regarding education or prior experience.
Education and training may be defined to include only formal pro-
grams; skills learned in nonpaid work or at home often are disre-
garded. When selecting what factors in the job are to be
compensated, conscious or intentional bias can again enter the job
evaluation process. Skills involved in typically women's work often
are ignored. The choice of factors to compensate and the weight
given each factor also affect the relative ranking ofjobs and the pay
they receive. For instance, "physical effort" usually will include lift-
ing, but may not include manual dexterity; it also may emphasize
strength, but ignore fatigue factors such as repetitive work or strain
from prolonged dealings with the public. Also, negotiating (usually
thought of as a man's job) may be rated more highly than counsel-
ing (usually associated with women). The importance of the factors
also are subject to the perceptions of job evaluators who may dis-
dain "women's work" or "blackjobs." Indeed, in the Study the con-
sultants noted that physical effort was overemphasized in certain job
classifications, but because small weight was given these factors in
the merit system, its influence on the 'ultimate evaluation was
limited.5"
Moreover, many jobs were designed in an age when discrimina-
tion against women and blacks, in terms of the type of work they
were permitted to do, still was legal. For example, women were not
allowed to work overtime or do jobs requiring the lifting of weights.
Thus, they were confined to jobs labeled "women's jobs" which
were undervalued as such. "Emphasis on 'male' factors such as
physical labor, strength, gross manual operations, or even routine
operations, rather than on manual dexterity, visual acuity, stress,
and fatigue characteristics of the light assembly or high speed press
operations-tasks assigned to women-would result in higher rates
for 'male' jobs."5 9 In setting pay for the jobs, prior discriminatory
wage patterns, which were established and commonly used prior to
passage of the EPA and Title VII,60 may be merged into and perpet-
uated by current pay patterns.
The State's most frequently used evaluation system, a factor
ranking system based on evaluation of a "key job," also may perpet-
uate bias in job evaluation. This evaluation method selects a "key
58. Study, supra note 26, at IV-6.
59. Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 438 (footnote omitted).
60. See supra note 28.
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job" for evaluation within a category of jobs, and then ranks other
jobs in relation to that key job. When women's jobs are compared
only to other women's jobs, and men's jobs are compared only to
other men's jobs, the same factors may be rated -differently. This
system also transmits any undervaluation or overvaluation of the key
job to the other jobs which have been "keyed" to it. Also, the key
jobs used are often male jobs, thus setting the pattern for factors
and factor weights associated with male jobs to be valued at similar
levels. Another evaluation system, simple rank ordering, is fraught
with the potential pitfalls enumerated above.
A discussion of these sources of conscious or unconscious bias
in the job evaluation and pay-setting process would have provided
relevant background for the Study. A discussion of the potential for
similar bias in the merit system would have appropriately qualified
the Study's conclusions, and, moreover, would have highlighted the
Study's conclusion that reliance on the market by the State to set
periodic pay increases is a process which itself incorporates appar-
ent wage discrimination.6i
b. Undervaluation of Female-Dominated Jobs.-The pay disparity
between female-dominated and male-dominated jobs was found by
the Study to range from three percent to twenty percent in 1985 and
zero to eighteen percent in 1986.62 These results evidence 63 that
employees in female-dominated job classes of the state merit system
are "being paid less than would be predicted."'  Furthermore, this
adverse effect is simply a result of the employees being in female-
dominated classes.65
(1) Targeted pay increase did not mitigate gender-based wage discrep-
ancies.-The consultants took pains to emphasize the apparent re-
duction in wage disparity caused by a Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 pay
increase targeted to undervalued, female-dominated job classifica-
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
63. The Study used the phrase "strong indication." Study, supra note 26, at IV-24.
64. Id.
65. The finding that female-dominated classes were undervalued from 3% to 20% in
1985 and 0% to 18% in 1986 less than male-dominated classes as a whole does not
exclude the possibility of dispersion among each of the gender-dominated classes. That
is, there are some female-dominated classes that share the same point value yet differ in
pay grade, sometimes to a remarkable degree. The same is true for male-dominated
classes. While this manifests the lack of coherence and logic of the State's current com-
pensation system, it does not render nugatory the fundamental evidentiary finding of
undervaluation of female-dominated classes.
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tions under the ASR program. The Study incorporated the 1986
raise into calculations to revise the range of wage disparity down-
ward, but noted that the wage disparity remained statistically
significant.
66
The FY 1986 ASR pay increase was the first in what was later
described as a three-year program to upgrade salaries across the
board and provide additional raises to targeted positions.67 On the
surface, the program seemed designed to address the imbalance in
wages between female- and male-dominated classes in the merit sys-
tem: sixty-five percent of the jobs selected for special wage in-
creases were secretarial and clerical positions, "for which State
salaries have lagged in the market place." 6 After the Study was
presented to the Governor, however, the modest amelioration in
relative earnings achieved by the 1986 ASR was virtually wiped out
by FY 1987 and FY 1988 ASRs. In the FY 1987 and FY 1988 ASRs,
pay increases were given to a number of other job classifications
ranging from food administration personnel to attorneys and
agency deputy secretaries, in addition to across-the-board pay in-
creases.69 In fact, the number of employee positions which received
66. The consultants calculated that although the Fiscal Year (FY) 1986 pay increase
did narrow the disparity (the new range was 0% to 18% instead of 3% to 20%), the
difference in wages between female-dominated and male-dominated classifications was
not eliminated. Study, supra note 26, at IV-48.
The ASR increased the aggregate earnings ratio of women to men in the state
compensation system. 'Whereas before the pay increase working women in Maryland
earned 77 cents for every dollar working men earned, after the ASR working women in
Maryland earn 78 cents for every working man's dollar. Id, app. atJ-I to -2.
67. Budget Message to the Gen. Assembly of Maryland and the Budget in Brief (FY
1987), Annapolis, at 72 Uan. 15, 1986) [hereinafter Budget in Brief (FY 1987)]; Budget
Message to the Gen. Assembly of Maryland and the Budget in Brief (FY 1988), Annapo-
lis, at 74 (Jan. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Budget in Brief (FY 1988)]. The FY 1986 Budget
Message did not refer to the three-year program. Budget Message to the Gen. Assembly
of Maryland and the Budget in Brief (FY 1986), Annapolis, at 74-75 (Jan. 16, 1985)
[hereinafter Budget in Brief (FY 1986)].
68. Budget in Brief (FY 1986), supra note 67, at 75. There was no other indication of
an intent to provide relief to female-dominated job classifications generally. The FY
1986 Budget in Brief made no mention that this was the first of a three-year program.
Out of 17,224 jobs that received increases that fiscal year, 11,000 were secretarial
and clerical positions; 3,500 were health professionals, including physicians, nurses and
licensed practical nurses. Id. In addition to the targeted increases, there was a 4%
across-the-board salary increase for classified state employees.
69. Budget in Brief (FY 1987) & Budget in Brief (FY 1988), supra note 67. The FY
1987 salary adjustment included a 3.5% across-the-board increase and an ASR raise to
18,375 employees, including data processing, fiscal and revenue support, social work,
counseling, corrections, law enforcement, food administration, investigation, and prop-
erty appraisal personnel. Budget in Brief (FY 1987), supra note 67, at 72. The FY 1988
salary adjustment included a 2.5% across-the-board increase and an ASR raise to 17,385
employees, including engineers, skilled tradespeople, institutional laborers, attorneys,
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ASR increases approached the total number of positions on the
state payroll. 70 Therefore, the pay equity improvement of the 1986
ASR-ifit.was a pay equity improvement at a117 -was erased by the
nondedicated 1987 and 1988 ASRs. As a result, the range of wage
disparity between female-dominated and male-dominated jobs was
once again from three percent to twenty percent in 1987.
In the absence of plans to adopt a pay equity policy 72 or any
real effort to begin addressing the problems documented in the
Study, the advisability of 6sing ASRs for relief deserves mention.
The State utilizes ASRs to target specific job classes that demon-
strate recruitment and retention difficulties. 7' The ASR- process
may be utilized to target undervalued jobs for salary increases in
order to remedy the disparities documented in the Study. This use
of ASRs may seem better than none at all.. Because the process nec-
essarily excludes classes that may be deserving of equitable raises,
but are not included in the targeted pay increase plan, it is by defini-
tion nonsystematic. In addition, ifjob classes that are not underval-
ued receive pay increases in order to achieve other goals (e.g.,
provide recruitment incentives, respond to political pressures), the
adjustment may increase the imbalance in internal equity even
further.
The ASR process also is subject to political pressures. For ex-
ample, the FY 1988 ASR targeted 17,385 employees as introduced
by the Governor.7 4 In an effort to prevent the state budget from
exceeding spending limits imposed by the legislature, the General
hearing officers, nurses, physicians, social workers, deputy secretaries, supply and serv-
ices supervisors, and other laborers. Budget in Brief (FY 1988), at 74-75, supra note 67.
70. More than 52,760 positions received ASR raises in FYs 1986, 1987 and 1988.
Budget in Brief (FY 1986), Budget in Brief (FY 1987), & Budget in Brief (FY 1988), supra
note 67. The total number of positions on the state payroll, including classified and
unclassified, full- and part-time, was 55,300. Questionnaire, supra note 37, at 1.
71. The words of Delegate Kreamer before the House Appropriations Committee
when testifying about her comparable worth bill were prophetic:
The happy coincidence of the FY 1986 salary package giving 11 percent raises
to many female- and minority-dominated classes is undermined when placed in
the context of a three-year plan which will upgrade most state employees' pay,
since most state employers [sic] are underpaid when pay for their jobs is com-
pared to pay for the same jobs in the private sector. The net effect of the over-
all upgrading does not solve the pay equity problem.
Hearing on H.B. 1461 Before the House Appropriations Comm., 1986 Sess. (Mar. 17, 1986)
(testimony of Delegate Barbara 0. Kreamer).
72. Questionnaire, supra note 37, at 4.
73. Study, supra note 26, at V-7.
74. Budget in Brief (FY 1988), supra note 67, at 74. There were approximately
55,300 total positions in the merit system at the time. See also supra note 69.
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Assembly delayed the special salary increase by one month.7 5
(2) Adjustment of workweek hours does not deflect evidence of gender-
based wage discrimination.-The initial results of the Study were based
on a comparison of annual salaries. After the first draft of the Study
was presented, 7 6 the Commission requested the consultants to con-
duct the same analysis by conforming workweek hours, i.e., some
employees work 35.5 hours per week while others work forty hours
per week.7 7
On the second run, the consultants adjusted the annual salaries
to conform workweek hours. The Study misses the mark, however,
by projecting the actual annual salaries of gender-dominated classes
to supposed comparable hourly figures. First, there is no reason to
assume that the actual number of hours worked per week is related
to the annual salary established for the job class.78 Second, the
State already has demonstrated that weekly work hours are fungible
factors in relation to annual salaries. 79 Third, because employees
may not choose one or the other workweek, this factor simply be-
comes part of the working conditions for the job and should be
treated as such in the consultants' analysis rather than as a separate
variable.80
Moreover, instead of conforming the workweek hours of the FY
1985 salary figures, the consultants conducted their amended statis-
75. Telephone interview with John Donaldson, Principal Analyst, Budget Review
Div., State Dep't of Fiscal Servs. (Apr. 20, 1987); see also The Sun (Baltimore), Mar. 7,
1987, at A-8, col. 2.
76. Draft Report, supra note 25.
77. Letter from the Commission on Compensation and Personnel Policies to Gover-
nor Harry Hughes (Mar. 25, 1986) (enclosing a copy of the Study).
78. The workweek of full-time employees was defined as consisting of "5 working
days, and not fewer than 351/2 hours or more than 40 hours." MD. REGS. CODE tit. 6,
§ 06.01.0 1.01 (repealed). There was no requirement of either 35.5 or 40 hours; these
totals were instead offered as a range, depending on the preferences of the various de-
partments and agencies.
Furthermore, annual salaries include factors such as actual hours worked, paid ver-
sus unpaid lunch periods, and compensatory time expected. Projected hourly figures
fail to compensate for these factors. A 40-hour per week job with paid lunch periods
may correspond to a 35.5-hour per week job with unpaid lunch periods in terms of
actual hours worked. Letter from the Maryland Commission for Women to the Gover-
nor's Commission (Feb. 5, 1986).
79. A scan of the list of class salaries and adjusted salaries in appendix E of the Study
shows a mix of work hours within similar categories: communications clerks, correc-
tional officers, engineering technicians, maintenance engineers/supervisors, natural re-
sources police/managers, supply clerks/officers, food service workers, and nurses.
Study, supra note 26, at app. E.
80. It is interesting to note, as did the Study, that 86% of the female-dominated
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tical analysis on the FY 1986 salaries-the year in which many fe-
male-dominated job classifications received their temporary
upgrading in relation to male-dominated jobs in the first of a three-
year program.8 ' Because the temporary upgrading was to be elimi-
nated in the ASR programs of the succeeding two years, and the
State presumably knew that such was the plan,82 it was statistically
inappropriate and misleading to base the workweek adjustment
analysis on that year's salaries. Nevertheless, on the basis of the tem-
porarily upgraded FY 1986'salaries, the consultants concluded that,
after adjustment for workweek hours, the statistical difference be-
tween the female-dominated and male-dominated classes narrowed
to "slight if any statistically significant difference. s8 3 The temporary
- amelioration in the figures was to disappear the following year when
the remaining job classes received their ASR pay increase.
The consultants acknowledged doubts about the workweek
analysis by admitting that "the circumstances surrounding the
number of hours in the workweek diminishes the value of this analy-
sis."84 Therefore, the rerun of the Study under adjusted workweek
hours does not refute, mitigate or invalidate the findings of under-
valuation of female-dominated classes.8 5
c. Use of Market Data.-The labor market data used by the State
in restructuring and regrading its several classification systems is de-
classes were on restricted work schedules, while only 56% of the male-dominated classes
worked a 35.5 hour workweek. Study, supra note 26, at IV-15.
Also, there is no consideration of whether the difference in hours worked also af-
fects the pension benefits of the employees on the restricted schedules.
81. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
82. Interestingly, in announcing the FY 1986 ASR in the Budget, the State did not
indicate that the increases were part of a three-year program, so that it would have been
impossible to know that an inappropriate base was being used. The FY 1987 and 1988
Budget Messages did refer to the three-year program. Budget in Brief (FY 1987), supra
note 67, at 72; Budget in Brief (FY 1988), supra note 67, at 74.
83. Study, supra note 26, at IV-47. In fact, however, the wage disparity after adjust-
ment for workweek hours, even when conducted on the wrong set of salary figures,
ranged from 0% to 9% in the current system and from 2% to 12% in the proposed
system. Those ranges are not statistically insignificant, despite their perfunctory dismis-
sal by the consultants. Plus, if the temporary effect of the FY 1986 ASR had been re-
moved by basing the adjusted analysis on FY 1985 salaries, the range of wage disparity
would have been more than 0% to 9% (and 2% to 12% in the proposed system)-
significantly more in statistical terms.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Nevertheless, in its response to the General Accounting Office survey of state
activities on pay equity, the State replied that the Study did not conclude that sex-based
wage difference existed after controlling for job evaluation scores. Questionnaire, supra
note 37, at 11.
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rived from published wage and salary surveys. The Study demon-
strated that the use of at least one local wage survey can import
wage discrepancies not based on job content (i.e., gender-based dis-
crepancies) from the market into the state pay system.86 The market
wage survey that the consultants tested, 87 one of several regularly
used by the State in determining benchmark classes for revision of
salary schedules, covers forty percent of the occupational categories
in the state classification system. 8 The Study found that, when sam-
ple jobs were selected from the wage survey89 and ranked according
to job content point factor evaluation, the male-dominated jobs in
the sample had 6.8 percent higher market salaries than the combined
male and female jobs in the sample. Unfortunately, the consultants
did not report how the salaries of the female-dominated jobs com-
pared to the male-dominatedjobs. In any event, the regression line
of the female-dominated job salaries must lie below that of the com-
bined male and female jobs, so one can infer that they were at least
6.8 percent below the male-dominated job salaries.90
Thus, the Study demonstrates how documented gender-based
wage discrepancies are knowingly imported into the state merit
system.
d. Job Segregation.-As pointed out above, job segregation has
been found to be directly related to undervaluation of female-domi-
natedjobs. 9 ' This has been attributed in a number of disciplines to
the fact that people of both sexes tend to rate characteristics, values
and activities of men more highly than those of women, that sex-
based stereotypes persist in attitudes toward women's productivity,
absenteeism and labor cost, and that attitudes shaped when wage
discrimination in- female-dominated jobs was legal linger into the
present.92 Maryland is no exception to the rule of segregation of
86. Study, supra note 26, at V-15 to -17.
87. Id at V-15 (relying on BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AREA WAGE SURVEYS OF THE
BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA).
88. Id. at V-10, Exh. V-3. It is not indicated how many job classes are within each
occupational category. The State at present has 4,150 job classifications for 47,450 clas-
sified positions (there are 55,300 total positions) and uses four primary job evaluation
systems to set pay for most of the classified jobs. Questionnaire, supra note 37, at 1.
89. Sample jobs included in the Baltimore Area Wage Survey were file clerk II, typist
I, payroll clerk, secretary III, guard I, tractor-trailer truck driver, automotive mechanic,
and maintenance electrician. Id. at V-15.
90. Study, supra note 26, at V-16.
91. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
92. Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 415-28; NAS STUDY, supra note 4, at 56-62; COMPARA-
BLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 96-102.
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women into low-paying jobs. Seventy percent of the state employ-
ees holding jobs paying $0 to $15,000 per year are women.9 3 In an
attempt to determine the reasons for segregation of women into the
low-paying merit system jobs, the consultants concluded that wo-
men apply for and accept low-paying, dead-end jobs more than
men.9 4 The Study gave short shrift, however, to the societal influ-
ences at play in women's choices. Noted experts have shown that
job segregation is not solely the result of free choice as the Study
consultants interpreted the survey to mean.95 A recent study noted
the following barriers among the variety of legal, institutional and
informal barriers which limit women's access to male-dominated
jobs:
- Recruitment systems that depend on worker refer-
als [sic] or on male-dominated pre-employment settings
such as vocational education classes or the military;
- Employer-imposed requirements for nonessential
training or credentials that women often lack;
- Veterans' preference policies;
- Promotion and transfer rules, which may count a
job applicant's seniority in a male-dominated department
more heavily than overall seniority in an entire plant;
- Pre-employment barriers to job training, such as
age restrictions for apprenticeships.96
Although more difficult to measure, the recent study noted that em-
ployer and co-worker attitudes about appropriate jobs for women
and men "lead some to discriminate-to consider gender in hiring
workers and assigning them to jobs."97 As to the hard questions
concerning societal influences affecting job decisions, the consul-
tants recognized their inability to detect and analyze the long-term,
subtle effects of deliberate tracking through the limited survey.98
The consultants concluded that the concentration of women in
the lowest-paying third of the merit system job classifications was
not due to the undervaluation of the jobs. That is, women would
predominate in those low-paying jobs even if their jobs were evalu-
ated by a comparable worth job evaluation system.99 The consul-
93. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
94. Study, supra note 26, at VI-20.
95. Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 401-10; NAS STUDY, supra note 4, at 52-56; SEX SEG-
REGATION ON THE JOB, supra note 4.
96. SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB, supra note 4, at A-8.
97. Id.
98. Study, supra note 26, at VI-20 to -2 1.
99. Id. at VI-37.
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tants seem to have conducted this test on the premise that women
may prefer those jobs because the jobs are low-paid. °0 The results
should not be surprising: concentration persists whether jobs are
undervalued or are comparably valued. Jobs are undervalued be-
cause women hold them; women do not hold those jobs because
they are undervalued. This part of the survey, it would seem, con-
tributes nothing to the analysis of the causes for concentration.
The consultants presented the final results of their Study to the
Governor's Commission on February 26, 1986.
4. Recommendations of the Governor's Commission.-The Gover-
nor's Commission submitted its report to the Governor on March
25, 1986, enclosing a copy of the Study and recommending to the
Governor that:
1. The state should adopt a goal of attaining and
maintaining both competitiveness in the marketplace and
internal equity in its compensation system.
2. The state should adopt a point factor job evalua-
tion methodology as a guide in establishing compensation
levels.
3. The state should continue to use the Annual Sal-
ary Review process to attain and maintain competitiveness
and internal equity in its compensation system.
4. The state should minimize gender domination in
its classifications. Means to this end should include re-
moval of artificial barriers to employment, examination of
recruitment procedures, use of training and individual de-
velopment programs, and such other means as may be
effective.10
The first recommendation urges adoption of a policy rather
than action to be taken to remedy the gender-based wage disparities
detected by the Study. Nevertheless, if the State adopts a policy of
maintaining internal equity-as long as internal equity is defined to
include the elimination of gender as a factor in the job evaluation
and pay-setting process-it would be a tiny but appropriate step in
the right direction. Maintaining competitiveness in the marketplace
is not in itself an objectionable policy if, in fact, the state compensa-
100. "To test for possible effects on female concentration in lower-paying jobs due to
job content value of the work, two analyses were conducted.... What [the results] do
indicate is that while undervaluation exists, it is not sufficient to explain the concentra-
tion of females in lower-paying positions." Id. at VI-35 to -37 (emphasis added).
101. Letter from and recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Governor
Harry Hughes (Mar. 25, 1986) (accompanying the Study).
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tion system is sensitive to the marketplace at all, and if it does not
import into the merit system unconstitutional gender-based wage
discrimination.
In its second recommendation, the Governor's Commission se-
lected a point factor job evaluation system over other methods of
addressing inequities in compensation levels in the merit system.
The third recommendation that the State continue to use ASRs
as a method of attaining and maintaining internal equity in the com-
pensation system, if the AS1s in fact operate to eliminate the gen-
der-based wage discrepancies evidenced in the Study, would be
another step on the road to pay equity in Maryland. Comparable
worth advocates urge the elimination of gender-based wage dispari-
ties regardless of methodology.
The fourth recommendation, elimination of gender domination
in jobs, is important because the concentration of women in certain
jobs and the undervaluation of those jobs are related, as the Study
noted. It must be clear that reducing the concentration of women in
certain jobs cannot be the primary effort of the State to cure gender-
based wage discrimination. Desegregation of jobs by gender does
not address the wage disparity experienced by women and men who
hold those jobs. Gender domination in pink ghetto jobs is the prod-
uct of a long history of legal and social traditions. It will take a long
time and much social evolution to change that pattern. Encourag-
ing women and men to follow different career patterns will help
those workers avoid the low status that accompanies pink ghetto
jobs. But employees who are proud of their work in those jobs and
who have invested much of their time, effort and skills in performing
those jobs should not be required to leave their jobs in order to
avoid gender-based wage discrimination. It is the duty of the State
to eliminate gender-based wage discrimination. Breaking up clus-
ters of its victims is not the only, nor the most direct, remedy.
Implementation by the State of the combination of recommen-
dations made by the Governor's Commission-if the recommenda-
tions are appropriately designed-would signal that the State has
taken necessary steps to eliminate the gender-based wage disparity
documented in the Study.
B. Executive Action to Implement Recommendations
As of July 1988 the recommendations of the Governor's Com-
mission have not been acted upon by the executive branch of the
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State of Maryland. HouseJoint Resolution 58,102 which passed dur-
ing the 1986 General Assembly session,'0 3 directed the Maryland
Department of Personnel (DOP) to develop a plan of action to im-
plement the recommendations of the Governor's Commission. The
Governor directed DOP to submit a plan to implement three of the
recommendations" °4 by September 1, 1986. DOP's response to the
joint resolution was criticized in a legislative analysis by the Depart-
ment of Fiscal Services.' 0 5
In January 1987, a new administration took office in Annapolis.
During the January-April General Assembly session, the administra-
tion took no action to implement the recommendations. Over the
summer interim session, a Special Oversight Subcommittee on Per-
sonnel (Subcommittee) requested DOP to present a plan for com-
plying with House Joint Resolution 58.106 DOP had been granted a
grace period by the Subcommittee so that the new administration
could have some time to settle in and " 'clean house' prior to statu-
tory intervention."'' 0 7 DOP in effect rejected the three Governor's
Commission recommendations on the ground that they were
"flawed."' 0 8
102. HJ. Res. 58, 1986 Sess. See also infra note 130 and accompanying text.
103. The General Assembly session takes place each year for 90 days from approxi-
mately the middle ofJanuary to approximately the middle of April.
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text for the four recommendations of the
Commission. The first recommendation, adoption of a policy of attaining and maintain-
ing competitiveness in the marketplace and internal equity in the compensation system,
was not addressed by the Governor or the Special Oversight Subcommittee on
Personnel.
105. See State Dep't of Fiscal Servs., Comments: The Department of Personnel Plan
for Implementation [of] Recommendations of the Governor's Commission on Compen-
sation and Personnel Policies (Oct. 1986) [hereinafter Comments]. Among the inade-
quacies cited by the Department of Fiscal Services of the General Assembly were:
(a) failure to be "responsive to the spirit of what was intended when this report was
requested"; (b) failure to conduct an in-depth review of the compensation system and
develop a plan to improve it; (c) failure to set out planning mechanisms and criteria for
ASRs, especially methods to determine reliably the impact of ASRs on the goal of mini-
mizing gender discrimination; (d) failure to decide "what priorities the marketplace will
have in improving state salaries and what the competing concerns are"; (e) failure to set
out costs and a timetable for implementation of a point factor evaluation system; and
(f) failure to develop a comprehensive state compensation policy. Id. at 2. The Depart-
ment of Fiscal Services operates as the legislative reference service on bills and issues
involving fiscal matters.
106. SPECIAL OVERSIGHT SUBCOMM. ON PERSONNEL, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMM.,
INTERIM REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1987, 1987 Sess. (Interim) [hereinafter IN-
TERIM REPORT].
107. Id. at 95, Exh. 6.
108. Id. at 38. A more detailed report of the DOP's response is contained in DOP
RESPONSE, supra note 28.
1152
1988] COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE MARYLAND ERA
DOP criticized using ASRs to address compensation inequities
as inherently unfair and ineffective.' 0 9 The Subcommittee accepted
DOP's characterization of the ASR process as "flawed" and made
three recommendations: (1) DOP should develop an equitable and
affordable compensation system that does not have any of the
"identified 'flaws'" of the ASRs; (2) DOP should inform the Sub-
committee on its recommendations for changes to the compensa-
tion system; and (3) DOP should identify to the Subcommittee those
classifications that are targeted for change, continuation and/or ter-
mination in ASRs of subsequent fiscal years. 1
Although not without their own logical inconsistency,".' DOP's
criticisms of the ASR process as a tool to remedy the gender-based
109. The DOP asserted that using ASRs produces "inequities and special privileges."
DOP RESPONSE, supra note 28, at 3. In particular, the DOP gave three reasons why it
considers the use of ASRs to achieve internal equity inherently unfair: First, approxi-
mately 10% of the workforce -received no pay increase in the annual ASR raises of FYs
1986, 1987, and 1988; therefore, using ASRs may exclude some employees. Second, the
beneficiaries of the FY 1986 pay increases, the first of a three-year program of pay in-
creases, were afforded "special privilege" by virtue of their being first. Third, the ASR
pay increases were distributed on the basis of occupation rather than job classification,
in a manner that the DOP labeled "disparate treatment" (e.g., one occupation received
24% of the raises; three occupations received no raises). Id. at 3-4.
The DOP also maintained that the ASRs are not effective in creating and maintain-
ing competitiveness with area jurisdictions in terms of cost-of-living compensation. The
DOP also stated that ASRs should be used only to increase pay where there are specific
"occupational or classification-specific problems" and only after an across-the-board pay
raise for the entire workforce. Finally, the DOP characterized the process of requesting
and getting approval for ASRs as being so lengthy that any real benefit is obscured; that
is, the long lead time frustrates efforts to address small-scale compensation problems.
Id. at 5-7.
110. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 106, at 40.
111. The DOP's argument that using ASRs creates inequities and special privileges
overlooks the fundamental purpose of the ASR process: ASRs are utilized as a method
of adjusting pay levels of specific classes ofjobs. Frequently, ASRs are used to adjust the
pay levels of job classes that experience recruitment and retention difficulties. ASRs
also have been used to generally adjust the entire salary schedule. Routinely, annual
across-the-board pay increases have been distributed through this process, and recently,
the ASRs were used to target job classes that were undervalued relative to other job
classes in the merit system. Targeting job classifications for raises through the ASR
process, therefore, has been a matter of practice in Maryland since at least 1971.
By necessity, targeting excludes those job classifications that are determined either
not to be undervalued or not to have recruitment and retention problems. The argu-
ment that pay increases targeted at undervalued jobs are inequitable and give a special
privilege to the targeted job classes is counter-intuitive. Rather, it is inequitable not to
select undervalued job classes for pay increases. It is those job classes that are not un-
dervalued, and thus do not require pay raises to reach some level of parity, that are the
specially privileged classes.
In addition, that ASRs have not been effective in maintaining cost-of-living compet-
itiveness with area jurisdictions is an indictment of the method of calculating pay in-
creases rather than a criticism of the system itself. Furthermore, the three-year program
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wage disparity evidenced in the Study miss the point. An effective
response to the recommendation would have included a presenta-
tion of alternative corrective mechanisms for curing the immediate
problem of gender-based wage discrepancy in the merit system
along with the description of the disadvantages of ASRs. As long as
the mechanism is adequate and reliable in removing gender as a fac-
tor in the setting of pay levels for jobs in the state compensation
system, the particular method chosen is unimportant. Utilization of
ASRs as a method of remedying the discrepancies detected in the
Study is one option available to the State, but it is not the only
option.
DOP also criticized the recommendation that it develop and in-
stall a point factor evaluation system as a guide in establishing pay
levels." 2 DOP asserted that a point factor evaluation system is
"flawed" in two respects: (1) it is based on an erroneous assump-
tion that there is an intrinsic value of jobs which can be measured,
and (2) it excludes the use of prevailing marketplace salary rates to
set wages.' 1 3 First, DOP misconstrues the 'role that point factor
evaluation systems play in the comparable worth process." 4 Sec-
ond, DOP fails to distinguish between the job evaluation and pay-
setting processes and misrepresents the importance of the market-
around which the Study and the Interim Report focused included across-the-board sal-
ary adjustments in addition to these targeted pay increases.
Finally, criticism of the protracted process by which ASRs are requested and ap-
proved focuses on mechanics that can be improved rather than on the problem that
needs to be addressed: gender-based wage disparity.
112. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 106, at 40-42.
113. Id. at 41.
114. The premise of comparable worth is that gender should not enter into the job
evaluation process. Point factor evaluation systems impose discipline on this process.
In a point factor evaluation system, a job is not held to any unique and absolute value.
Instead, it is the standards against which ajob is measured-the factors that make up the
job's "worth" to the employer, such as skill, education, physical effort, working condi-
tions, experience, and supervision-that are held constant, and the jobs are related or
measured to those standards. The employer's standards may change with time and the
employer may wish to revise them, and in so doing, revise the evaluation of the jobs.
Furthermore, each point factor evaluation system applies standards selected by and
adapted to each employer's own preferences and needs. Thus, each system may achieve
different results if the employers differ in preferences and in the factors they value in
their employees' jobs.
In any event, regardless ofjob evaluation results as to the rating of one job relative
to another, the goal of comparable worth is achieved-jobs are evaluated and rated with-
out gender being used as a factor in the evaluation. Indeed, the "flaw" that the DOP
criticized is, in fact, the advantage of a point factor evaluation system: Each system is
appropriate and unique to each employer, to achieve the employer's own purposes,
without importing gender discrimination into the process. I
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place to the state compensation system." 5 Again, however, the
State's failure to remedy gender-based discrimination is not based
so much on the particular method adopted to redress the disparity.
The failure is based on the State's refusal to take any action on the
problem. Thus, DOP's assertion that it intends to "overhaul" the
existing classification system' 16 will not be effective if the reclassifi-
cation does not incorporate a method of eliminating gender-based
wage discrepancies presently existing in the system.
The Subcommittee recommended that DOP take necessary
steps to revise the classification system "for purposes of achieving
an equitable/competitive system of public employment compensa-
tion."' 17 The Subcommittee did not address the question of how
DOP is to remedy gender-based wage discrepancies detected in the
system by the Study. Thus, the Subcommittee avoided an opportu-
nity to act on the Study.
In responding to the Governor's Commission's third recom-
mendation to develop and implement a plan to minimize gender
domination in the state classification system, DOP stated that re-
moval of artificial barriers to employment that foster occupational
segregation of women and minorities will be a part of its priority in
revising the state classification plan."' Removing barriers to the
entry of female and male applicants into non-traditional jobs where
115. A point factor job evaluation system can be adopted to clarify and systematize
the employers' own standards of evaluation, and at the same time to eliminate gender as
a factor in the process. Once jobs are evaluated and rated in relation to each other, the
levels of pay to be assigned to the rated jobs is set only by employers. The employer,
however, may not assign different levels of pay for jobs rated equally under the system.
Thus, the evaluation and the wage-setting are separate functions. The point factor sys-
tem eliminates discriminatory factors in the evaluation process. If the employer chooses
then to assign pay levels that prevail in the market to equally rated jobs, comparable
worth is no barrier. The same pay levels, however, must apply to all equally rated jobs.
Further, comparable worth advocates understand the temporary and fluctuating
effects of labor shortages and other events on recruitment and retention of employees.
Temporary pay increases for discrete job classifications are not beyond the realm of
comparable worth, provided the increases are indeed temporary and are available for
both female-dominated and male-dominated jobs that experience recruitment difficul-
ties. That is, both physicians and nurses should benefit.
Finally, the DOP itself recognizes the limited role that market rates perform in the
state compensation system. The DOP's discussion of the impracticality of conducting
wage surveys for over 2,900 job classifications, DOP RESPONSE, supra note 28, at 11, and
the limited number of occupational categories covered by existing wage surveys, as well
as the restricted sample of employers surveyed in the few annual surveys upon which the
State presently relies, Study, supra note 26, at V-11, do not support a claim that prevail-
ing market rates affect the merit system to any substantial degree.
116. DOP RESPONSE, supra note 28, at 13.
117. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 106, at 42.
118. DOP RESPONSE, supra note 28, at 14.
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they have concentrated is one prong of an attack on the segregation
of employees in the workforce."' Other personnel practices that
lead to or encourage the concentration of women in particular jobs
also require attention. The Study noted, for instance, that the State
has no proactive program for informing job candidates of non-tradi-
tional job opportunities. 2 0
DOP also commented that its efforts would not cure "social and
cultural influences over which we have no control."' 2 ' It is clear
that DOP has no duty to cure the ills of society; it does have a duty,
though, of curing the ills of the merit system. The fact that social
and cultural bias exists in society relieves no employer from the duty
to eliminate discrimination in its employment practices. The Study
evidenced undervaluation of jobs where women are concentrated.
As previously discussed, other studies show that concentration of
women almost inevitably results in undervaluation ofjobs.1 22 DOP
must take steps to eliminate the undervaluation of jobs where wo-
men are concentrated. It also should take steps to prevent the track-
ing of female employees into low-paying jobs where much of the
discriminatory undervaluation takes place.
The Subcommittee recommended that DOP integrate system-
atic procedures to remove artificial employment barriers that may
foster segregation into the revision of the state classification plan.' 23
The Subcommittee also endorsed DOP's reliance on the United States
Government Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Dictionary)1 24 to validate edu-
cational and experience qualification standards for state jobs. In its response
DOP had referred to the Dictionary as a standard on which it relies to
establish educational and experience-based criteria for job appli-
cants. DOP gave no indication, however, as to how a dictionary of
titles for generic jobs can accurately guide qualification criteria for
state jobs, how many state jobs are covered in the Dictionary, or
whether the Dictionary itself is an appropriate and adequate resource
upon which to rely. The federal government has not conducted a
119. While a desegregation of the workforce by gender should apply to both sexes,
the positive effects, to a large extent, would inure to the benefit of the female employees.
Study results previously discussed detect an undervaluation in female-dominated jobs
and a corresponding overvaluation in male-dominated jobs. See supra note 40 and ac-
companying text.
120. Study, supra note 26, at VI-22.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
123. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 106, at 43.
124. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (4th ed.
1978).
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study of its own classification system, and there is nothing at all to
support an inference that the federal government's guidelines are
not themselves flawed.' 25
C. Legislative Action to Implement Recommendations
As ofJuly 1988, the General Assembly of Maryland has failed to
implement the recommendations of the Commission. Indeed, the
relevant legislative subcommnittee that deals with the issue of pay eq-
uity for state employees has expressly declined to implement the
recommendations of the Commission.
1. 1986-House Bill 1461.-House Bill 1461,126 the first com-
parable worth bill proposed in Maryland, 127 was introduced inJanu-
ary 1986. As originally drafted, it called for the adoption of a
comparable worth policy and mandate, adoption of a point factor
evaluation system, and the monitoring of annual evaluations by a
pay equity committee. Despite the support of the majority of a large
number of organizations testifying at the Appropriations Committee
hearing, and despite testimony which highlighted the results of the
Study,' 28 the bill was amended to remove the comparable worth
components and introduced a goal of balancing marketplace com-
petitiveness with internal equity.' 29  The DOP opposed the bill.
The amended bill did not pass in that session.
2. 1986-House Joint Resolution 58.-House Joint Resolution
58,30 which passed the General Assembly and was signed into law
on May 13, 1986,'1' was originally directed to the problem of dead-
125. DOP RESPONSE, supra note 28, at 14.
126. H.B. 1461, 1986 Sess.
127. H.J. Res. 60, which preceded the Study, urged the Commission to expedite its
review of the job classification system and expressed a sense of the General Assembly
that any revision of the state compensation system incorporate remedies for unequal pay
for positions of comparable skill, effort, working conditions, duties, experience, respon-
sibilities or authority, and that the General Assembly have an opportunity to approve the
revision. H.J. Res. 60, 1984 Sess. H.J. Res. 60 was introduced on February 20, 1984,
and passed the General Assembly on April 6, 1984.
128. See Hearing on H.B. 1461 Before the House Appropriations Comm., 1986 Sess. (Mar. 17,
1986) (testimony of Delegate Barbara 0. Kreamer and Eileen Stein, Commissioner,
Maryland Commission for Women).
129. For an interpretation of the amended bill by the Office of the Attorney General,
see Letter to Delegate Barbara 0. Kreamer from Robert A. Zamoch, Counsel to the
General Assembly (Apr. 7, 1986).
130. H.J. Res. 58, 1986 Md. Laws 3566 (as amended and passed into law asJ. Res.
29).
131. J. Res. 29, 1986 Md. Laws 3566.
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end, female-dominated clerical positions. 3 2 The final version
called for the DOP to develop a "plan of action" to implement the
recommendations of the Governor's Commission. It required the
DOP to submit a plan of implementation by December 1, 1986.
3. 1987-Howe Bill 1067.-House Bill 1067'. was introduced
on February 9, 1987. The bill mandated equal pay for work of equal
value, established a pay equity committee to advise the Secretary of
Personnel on a point factor evaluation system to be adopted and
implemented by the Secretary and required an annual pay equity
ASR appropriation to meet the requirements of the bill. A hearing
on the bill was held March 9, 1987, before the Appropriations Com-
mittee. Again, testimony highlighted the need for a bill to remedy
the wage discrepancies revealed in the Study, and again, the DOP
opposed the session's pay equity bill.'" 4 On March 24, 1987, the
Appropriations Committee unanimously voted down House Bill
1067.'1 5
4. 1988-Howe Bill 530.-On January 27, 1988, House Bill
530"36 was introduced in the General Assembly. Similar to its pred-
ecessors, House Bills 1461 and 1067, 1' House Bill 530 required
that all positions in the merit system of equal value to the State be
paid equally. It established a pay equity review committee to advise
the Secretary of Personnel on a point factor evaluation system to be
adopted and implemented by the Secretary of Personnel. Further, it
required an annual pay equity ASR appropriation to meet the pay
equity requirements of the bill. On February 29, 1988, the Appro-
priations Committee held a hearing on the bill. Once again, pay
equity advocates urged the Appropriations Committee to enact
mandatory pay equity requirements, and once again, the DOP op-
posed the session's pay equity bill.' The Secretary of Personnel
132. The joint resolution was amended to delete the original description of the posi-
tions intended to be covered-"dead-ended positions . .. generally office and clerical
classifications that are traditionally staffed by women and pay an average of 20 percent
less than positions traditionally staffed by men."
133. H.B. 1067, 1987 Sess.
134. See Hearing on H.B. 1067 Before the House Appropriations Comm., 1987 Sess. (Mar. 9,
1987) (position of DOP on the proposed legislation).
135. H.B. 1067 was one of a number of bills which were aggregated into one vote (a
"Consent Calendar" vote), the group being unanimously voted down. Interview with
Delegate Barbara 0. Kreamer, Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 22, 1987).
136. H.B. 530, 1988 Sess.
137. See supra notes 126 & 133 and accompanying text.
138. Hearing on H.B. 530 Before the House Appropriations Comm., 1988 Sess. (Feb. 29,
1988) (testimony of Hilda E. Ford, Secretary of Personnel).
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indicated her desire to overhaul the state classification of salary
plans and narrow the gap in pay rates between the merit system and
the labor market before considering implementation of any "objec-
tive job evaluation system."' I 9 The Appropriations Committee
unanimously voted down House Bill 530 on March 25, 1988.
D. Other Comparable Worth Activities in Maryland
In March 1983 the Montgomery County Council appointed a
Compensation Task Force (Task Force) to study compensation is-
sues, including equal pay for work of equal value (comparable
worth)., 4 ° In January 1985 the Task Force voted not to conduct a
job evaluation study of the county compensation system. In its final
report of July 1985 the Task Force recommended rejection of com-
parable worth in favor of determination of salary levels according to
the market. A three-month study of the county's evaluation system
recommended redefinition of physical demands, hazards, supervi-
sory factors, and credit for public service, all of which would signifi-
cantly affect female-dominated jobs.' 4 ' The study recommended a
revision of the evaluation factors in the county's job evaluation sys-
tem.' 42 For example, public service assistance was added to the
"skill" factor; the definition of "knowledge" was expanded to in-
clude knowledge acquired by formal study, by self-study, and by ex-
perience; "scope and effect" ofjob responsibility was broadened to
include recognition of supervision of fewer than three workers and
supervision of contractors; physical dexterity, fine finger movement
and continued staring into a video display terminal were added to
the "physical demand" evaluation factor. The county's consultants
applied the proposed revised evaluation system to the county job
classes. In that process, the majority of female-dominated classes
and seventeen male-dominated classes were advanced at least one
grade. Two hundred eighty-nine classes remained at the same
grade. If not for the evaluation process, sixty-six classes would have
139. Letter from Hilda E. Ford, Secretary of Personnel, to Delegate Barbara 0.
Kreamer (Mar. 28, 1988). In her response to Secretary Ford's letter, Delegate Kreamer
noted the inconsistency of the.Secretary's position: a point factor evaluation system is "a
reliable format for the kind of overhauling that our classification and pay system needs."
Letter from Delegate Barbara 0. Kreamer to Hilda E. Ford, Secretary of Personnel (Apr.
6, 1988).
140. Study, supra note 26, at 11-30. Montgomery County Commission for Women,
Chronology of Comparable Worth in Montgomery County Government (Nov. 1985).
141. PAY EQUITY NEws NoTEs, supra note 13, at 5.
142. Telephone interview with Judith Vaughn Prather, Executive Director, Montgom-
ery County Commission for Women (May 4, 1988).
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lost one grade or more. 4 The draft report of the consultants was
circulated for comment among county employees, pay equity advo-
cates, unions, and the county Department of Personnel. 44 The to-
tal cost of implementing the pay equity revisions is expected to be
about $3.5 million, or three percent of the county payroll. This
amount already has been set aside for this purpose from a desig-
nated surplus by the Montgomery County Council. When imple-
mented, the revised evaluation system will affect 490 classes ofjobs
among 5740 county employees.
In June 1984 the local Council (Maryland state employees) of
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) t 45 filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission on behalf of the clerical workers
at the University of Maryland.' 46 The complaint charged that the
University maintains a sex-segregated work force and a wage-setting
system that has adverse impact on its employees in female-domi-
nated jobs.
In February 1986 ten female faculty members of the University
of Maryland filed a class action suit in*United States District Court
charging intentional wage discrimination on the basis of sex.1
4 7
III. LITIGATION IN STATE COURT AS ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY
The wage'disparity persists in Maryland despite efforts to con-
vince the State to take steps to remedy the gender-based wage dis-
parity. Neither the executive nor legislative branches have seriously
attempted to resolve the documented discrimination. Inevitably, the
judicial branch may be called upon to remedy the unfairness.
Because direct channels for addressing wage discrimination
were first established at the federal level, victims of wage discrimina-
tion historically have applied to federal courts for relief. The fed-
eral route to remedies for sex-based wage discrimination, however,
143. Id.
144. Update of the status of Montgomery County's pay equity review was provided by
William P. Garrett, Director of Personnel, Montgomery County, Maryland. Telephone
interview with William P. Garrett, Director of Personnel, Montgomery County, Md. (July
14, 1988).
145. The two major employee associations representing state employees have sup-
ported comparable worth activities from the first. Both AFSCME and the MCEA partici-
pated in the Comparable Worth Committee, supra note 27, and supported comparable
worth legislation.
146. Maryland Comm'n for Women, supra note 27.
147. The Sun (Baltimore), Apr. 14, 1987, at B-2, col. 2.
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is riddled with obstacles.' 48 The state courts are a natural alterna-
tive. State constitutions and state courts are the oldest American
safeguards of civil rights. 149 Moreover, the protections of the four-
teenth amendment and federal statutes do not preclude a quest for
relief in the state courts.1 50 State courts, in fact, may offer advan-
tages not available in federal courts for bringing gender-based wage
discrimination suits.
A. State Laws Offer'Alternate, Independent Standards for
Gender-Based Wage Discrimination Lawsuits
State courts have final authority to decide issues arising under
their own constitutions; they need not and should not automatically
adopt federal interpretations. Federalist principles invite, indeed
compel, independent analysis of state constitutional provisions, 5 ,
It is incumbent on advocates who choose to litigate in state courts to
craft arguments based on independent analysis of the state constitu-
tional provisions. State history and traditions, legislative histories,
148. Generally, under the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), comparable worth suits
have been precluded by an interpretation of the Act that limits its coverage to jobs that
are equal or substantially equal. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S.
188, 203 n.24 (1974).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on
the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) (1982).
Under the disparate treatment theory of litigating Title VII cases, comparable worth has
become entangled in the courts' interpretation of what kind of inference will support the
requirement of intentional discrimination. Under the disparate impact theory of litiga-
tion, comparable worth has faced with difficulty the defense that reliance on the market
for determining wages is a legitimate business necessity.
As a litigation theory per se, some lower federal courts have accepted comparable
worth. See, e.g., Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 449-50 (W.D. Wis. 1982)
(plaintiffs failed to show that city's actions were motivated by discriminatory intent and
therefore could not show a violation of the equal protection clause). The circuit courts
of appeal, however, are reluctant to make determinations on the relative value of jobs
with different duties and responsibilities. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois,
783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986) ("the issue of comparable worth.., is not of the sort
that judges are well equipped to resolve intelligently"); Spaulding v. University of Wash-
ington, 740 F.2d 686, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984) (disparate com-
pensation for work of differing skills is not a prima facie violation of Title VII); Plemer v.
Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1983) (it is not the province of the court
to value the relative worth of different duties and responsibilities); Power v. Barry
County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (intentional discrimination may well
signal the outer limit of Title VII; comparable worth not encompassed).
149. Note, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: State Pathways Through Federal Road-
blocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115, 116 (1984-85) [hereinafter State Pathways].
Indeed, the Bill of Rights was modeled after the then 13 state constitutions. Id.
150. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV.
379, 381-82 (1980).
151. State Pathways, supra note 149, at 142.
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and records of constitutional debates are available to bolster the ar-
guments.' 52 Using this tactic, plaintiffs in gender-based wage dis-
crimination lawsuits may find protection in provisions of state
constitutions that the federal constitution-as recently interpreted
in federal courts-avoids.
As a matter of judicial practice, decisions of the Supreme Court
and the circuit courts of appeal on provisions of the United States
Constitution are merely persuasive authority, not controlling prece-
dent, on the interpretation of a comparable or identical state consti-
tutional provision. 5 3 When a state constitution includes a provision
that is absent in the federal constitution, such as an equal rights
amendment, there is no pari materia upon which to base a construc-
tion that may reach even the level of persuasive authority. There-
fore, state courts are free, as with a tabula rasa, to set their own
standards and apply their own analysis.
B. State ERAs Offer More Potent Protection than the United States
Constitution in the Case of Gender-Based Wage Discrimination
An ERA to a state constitution expresses the high value placed
on the protection of equal rights for women by the citizens of the
state. "'5 4 It is directed to a specific area of equality "out of which a
special body of new law can be created.""' It is an indicator of a
desire to provide additional protection to state residents.' 56 The
civil rights of blacks and the equal rights of women arose out of
different historical contexts and legal frameworks.' 5 7 For example,
in Maryland the ERA was adopted upon a direct popular vote. 158
These considerations compel a standard of judicial review for inter-
pretation of ERAs in state courts that reflects this special mandate
for equality. Thus, the standard applied by the Supreme Court in
cases involving sex discrimination under equal protection analysis is
152. See Note, Rediscovering the New Jersey E.R.A.: The Key to Successful Sex Discrimination
Litigation, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 253, 259 (1986) [hereinafter Key to Successful Sex Discrimination
Litigation].
153. See Andrews v. State, 291 Md. 622, 436 A.2d 1315 (1981); Smith v. State, 276
Md. 521, 350 A.2d 628 (1976).
154. Sixteen states have ERAs in their constitutions-Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. State Pathways, supra
note 149, at 121.
155. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 885 (1971).
156. State Pathways, supra note 149, at 141.
157. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 155.
158. See infra note 163.
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less stringent than that applied by a number of state courts inter-
preting their state ERAs, including Maryland.' 59 The Supreme
Court's equal protection analysis need not apply at all to ERA analy-
sis in state courts because the context of a state ERA significantly
alters the basis for adjudicating sex discrimination cases. State con-
stitutions, therefore, may provide more potent protection than that
available under the United States Constitution in the area of sex
discrimination.
IV. THE MARYLAND ERA
Because passage of the Maryland ERA' 6 ° represents a consen-
sus among the citizens of Maryland that a special value on the equal
ights for women deserves a place in the state constitution, it pro-
vides a special history upon which the court can rely in molding ap-
propriate and independent standards of review.
A. Maryland ERA Legislative History
The bill proposing an equal rights amendment to the Declara-
tion of Rights of the Constitution of Maryland was introduced for
the first time in the House of Delegates of the General Assembly on
February 14, 1972.161 It generated little debate on the legal impli-
159. See State Pathways, supra note 149, at 133; Linde, supra note 150, at 391; Rees, State
Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Individual Civil Rights, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 299, 301
(1978).
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973), a plurality of four Supreme
Court justices put gender in the category of a suspect classification requiring strict scru-
tiny. The Frontiero standard has not been applied to gender discrimination since it was
first announced. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), the Supreme Court re-
ferred to an intermediate standard ("substantially related to an important governmental
objective") to be used in sex discrimination cases brought under the equal protection
clause. Since its recent decisions on the subject have not found an "important" enough
or "legitimate" enough objective in a sex-based classification, however, the Court has
not addressed directly the standard of scrutiny to apply to sex discrimination once such
an objective is found. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731
(1982).
Standards of review adopted by state courts in interpreting their state ERAs range
from rational basis (classification based on sex will be upheld if it is rationally related to
a government interest) to the Craig intermediate level, to a strict scrutiny analysis, to an
absolute prohibition on the use of gender as a classification.
See infra notes 202-207 and accompanying text for a discussion of the present stan-
dard of review in Maryland.
160. MD. CONST. DECL. oF RTs. art. 46. The text of Maryland's ERA is: "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."
161. H.B. 687, 1972 Md. Laws 366.
Legislative history in Maryland dates back only to 1975, the date when committee
files were first retained as part of the record by the State Department of Legislative
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cations of the constitutional amendment 62 and passed both Houses
easily on April 4, 1972.163
The passage of the ERA signalled support for the general con-
cept of equal rights for women in Maryland at a time when the fed-
eral ERA had not yet passed the Congress. 164  It made sex
discrimination the only type of discrimination expressly banned in
the Constitution.' 6 5 It was designed to reform the market to end
gender bias.' 66 Indeed, passage of the Maryland ERA paved the
way for Maryland's ratification of the federal ERA.' 67 After passage
Reference. As a result, no official legislative history is available on the ERA. The pri-
mary sponsor of the bill, Charles Blumenthal, graciously agreed to be interviewed on
February 25, 1987, and provided an oral history on the process leading to passage of the
Bills discussed in the text.
The proposed ERA stated, "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged
or denied because of sex." In drafting the Maryland ERA, Mr. Blumenthal modeled his
bill on the federal ERA, changing only the phrase "on account of" in the federal ERA to
"because of" in its Maryland counterpart. Interview with Charles Blumenthal, former
delegate to the General Assembly, in Annapolis, Md. (Feb. 25, 1987) [hereinafter
Interview].
162. At the invitation of Delegate Blumenthal, 97 delegates, including all 9 women
delegates, co-sponsored the bill. The bill was assigned to the Constitutional and Ad-
ministrative Law Committee after its first reading (introduction) on February 14, 1972.
A large public hearing was held which was well covered by the media. Questions and
testimony centered around sensational concerns emphasized in the media at that time,
including anxiety over unisex toilets, the military draft of women, the loss of maternity
benefits, and the passing of a perceived era of chivalry. Those who testified on behalf of
the bill were members of the local chapters of the National Organization for Women
(NOW) from Annapolis, Montgomery County and Prince George's County and other
local activists. At the Committee vote, only one delegate opposed the bill. There were
no women on the Constitutional and Administrative Law Committee. When the bill
came up for a floor vote (second reading) in the House on March 15, 1972, there was a
minor technical amendment, but no floor debate. In the third reading and final floor
vote on March 22, 1972, the same questions and comments regarding unisex toilets and
the drafting of women into the military were made, but no legal questions were raised.
The House passed the bill by a vote of 120 to 1, with some abstentions. In the Senate,
the House bill took only one week to pass on a unanimous vote. Interview, supra note
161; 1972JouRNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES at 374, 1054-55, 1281-
82; 1972 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE at 1151, 1806, 1899.
163. See 1972 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES at 2070. The
ERA was ratified in the general election on November 7, 1972, by a vote of 697,107 to
236,007. Garrett County was the only county to fail to ratify the ERA, by a narrow mar-
gin. 1972 MD. MANUAL at 573. It was signed into law on December 5, 1972. 1972 Md.
Laws 366.
164. Maryland did not waiver: subsequent efforts to repeal the ERA and the House
and Senate joint resolutions ratifing the federal ERA failed. See HJ. Res. 96, 1973
Sess.; HJ. Res. 5, 1974 Sess.; H.B. 125, 1974 Sess.
165. Other types of discrimination are prohibited by the protections of MD. CONST.
DECL. OF RTS. art. 24. BurningTree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 99 n.10, 501 A.2d
817, 840 n.10 (1985).
166. Interview, supra note 161.
167. See Interview, supra note 161. Mr. Blumenthal was also the primary sponsor of
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of the ERA, a number of statutes were enacted that conformed ex-
isting employment rights law. to the new principle and signalled leg-
islative affirmation of the values now incorporated in the
Declaration of Rights.168
This special history of the Maryland ERA separates Maryland
jurisprudence from federal jurisprudence, where such a policy con-
sensus has yet to be reached, and compels an independent analysis
of issues involving gender discrimination arising under the Mary-
land ERA.
B. Standard of Review under the Maryland ERA
"When are the ladies coming?" asked a Maryland Court of Ap-
peals judge to the delegate who sponsored the ERA bill.' 6 0 Some
the House joint resolution to ratify the proposed federal ERA. H.J. Res. 102, 1972
Sess., was introduced on March 23, 1972, the day after the federal ERA passed the Con-
gress. By suspension of rules, the joint resolution passed the House on the same day
within 20 minutes, although by a narrower margin of votes (86 to 32) than the state ERA
had passed. The Senate passed it unanimously on April 1, 1972. Interview, supra note
161. An identical Senate joint resolution ratifying the federal ERA passed the Senate
unanimously, crossed paths with the House joint resolution, and eventually passed both
Houses on April 8, 1972. S.J. Res. 80, 1972 Sess. 1972 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF
THE HousE OF DELEGATES at 1330-31, 1499; 1972 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEN-
ATE at 1900-01, 2457.
168. Sections in the Maryland Code regulating the hours of labor for women were
repealed. 1972 Md. Laws 211 (repealing MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 52-55). The State's
Fair Employment Practices Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B (1986), was revised to prohibit
the limitation, segregation or classification of state employees on the basis of sex so as to
deprive the employees of employment opportunities. 1973 Md. Laws 493 (codified at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(2) (1986)). Sex was prohibited as a basis for determin-
ing qualification for state employment competitive examinations. 1975 Md. Laws 272
(codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 18(c) (1983)), Veterans' preference was ex-
tended to the disabled or surviving spouses of female veterans. Id. State employees
were protected from denial of promotion opportunities because they are on sick or ma-
ternity leave. 1974 Md. Laws 698 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 77A (1985)).
Provisions for part-time employment were added to the state merit system. 1975 Md.
Laws 701 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 51 (1983 & Supp. 1986)). Domestic
workers were included under the Worker's Compensation, 1975 Md. Laws 686 (codified
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 21(b)(9) (1985)), and minimum wage laws, 1973 Md. Laws
123 (repealing MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 82(e) (1985)). Unemployed women were ex-
tended the right to claim dependent's allowances for children wholly or partially sup-
ported by them. 1974 Md. Laws 708 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 3(c) (1985
& Supp. 1986)) (thereby removing the presumption that the father was the sole sup-
porter). Unemployment benefits were extended to pregnant women who, though physi-
cally able, lost employment through no fault of their own. 1973 Md. Laws 652 (codified
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6 (1985 & Supp. 1986)). Disability due to pregnancy Or
childbirth was included under temporary disabilities for all job-related purposes, and
differential treatment on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth in policies and practices
was prohibited. 1977 Md. Laws 907 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 17 (1986)).
169. Interview, supra note 161.
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months had passed and no litigants had raised issues on appeal
under the ERA. Maiyland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn 170
provided the court its first opportunity to consider the ERA. The
case, however, was not decided under the ERA because the court
found that the challenged statute did not on its face differentiate on
the basis of sex.' 7'
In 1977 the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed a case involv-
ing a law that on its face imposed a classification based on sex. Rand
v. Rand 72 addressed the constitutionality of the unilateral obliga-
tion of a father under common law to support his minor children.
In an emphatic and unified opinion, the court projected Maryland
into the ranks of states adopting an absolute standard of review for
their ERAs.173 Proceeding directly under the language of the con-
stitutional amendment, the court found it "clear and unambigu-
ous": 1 74  "This language mandating equality of rights can only
mean that sex is not a factor.' 75 The court underscored its deter-
mination to prohibit all classifications based on sex by deliberately
selecting from among a wide-ranging array ("from absolute to per-
missive") of state interpretations of ERAs an absolute standard. 76
The now familiar language used by the court reads as follows:
[W]e believe that the "broad, sweeping, mandatory lan-
guage" of the amendment is cogent evidence that the peo-
ple of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men
and women. The adoption of the E.R.A. in this state was
intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of
the validity of sex-based classifications.' 77
170. 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973).
171. The statutory scheme restricted cosmetologists, a female-dominated profession,
to cutting women's hair. Barbers, who were mostly men, were authorized to cut both
women's and men's hair. The plaintiffs attacked the statute under the ERA and the
fourteenth amendment. Even though the two relevant statutes patently divided the hair-
cutting profession into two segments that were differentiated by sex, the court found no
sex-based classification by concluding that the provision limiting cosmetologists applied
to both female and male cosmetologists. Therefore it was "not a case of discrimination
based on sex under the Fourteenth Amendment or Art. 46 [of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights]." Id. at 506-07, 312 A.2d at 222.
172. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
173. Note, The Maryland Equal Rights Amendment: Eight Years of Application, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 342 (1980) [hereinafter Eight Years of Application]; NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WO-
MEN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND AND WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, MARYLAND STATE
ERA EXPERIENCE, ERA IMPACT PROJECT (1981) [hereinafter ERA IMPACT PROJECT].
174. 280 Md. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03.
175. Id. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903.
176. Id. at 515, 374 A.2d at 904-05.
177. Id. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 905.
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The Maryland Court of Appeals applied the Rand absolute standard
to subsequent cases involving facial discrimination brought under
the Maryland ERA. 178 Classifications based on sex were repeatedly
struck down as violative of the ERA. 179
1. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum.-Until Burning Tree Club,
Inc. v. Bainum 180 the court had no occasion to review a state action
I
178. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51, 54 n.l, 475 A.2d 1180, 1181 n.1 (1984) (in dictum);
Turner v. State, 299 Md. 565, 576, 474 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1981) (law prohibiting "sit-
ters" in bars may not be applied only to women); Condore v. Prince George's County,
289 Md. 516, 532-33,425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (1981) (common-law doctrine of necessaries
may not be applied only to men); Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 593, 414 A.2d 929, 933
(1980) (common-law cause of action for criminal conversation no longer available only
to men); Kerr v. Kerr, 287 Md. 363, 369,412 A.2d 1001, 1004-05 (1980) (criminal liabil-
ity for nonsupport of wife violates ERA).
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also applied the new absolute standard. See
Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 48, 506 A.2d 263, 267 (1986) (no
balancing of interests permitted when adjudication of restaurant's skirt-and-gown-night
promotion finds discriminatory effect); Stem v. Stem, 58 Md. App. 280, 296, 473 A.2d
56, 64 (1984) (duty of child support extends to both parents); McClellan v. McClellan,
52 Md. App. 525, 531, 451 A.2d 334, 338-39 (1982) (presumption of husband's domi-
nance in a marriage is not permitted under the ERA); Hofmann v. Hofmann, 50 Md.
App. 240, 244, 437 A.2d 247, 249 (1981) (husband may also claim alimony); Tidler v.
Tidler, 50 Md. App. 1, 10, 435 A.2d 489, 495 (1981) (counsel fees may be awarded
against either spouse); Eckstein v. Eckstein, 38 Md. App. 506, 511, 379 A.2d 757, 761
(1978) (presumption of male dominance in marriage cannot stand); Bell v. Bell, 38 Md.
App. 10, 14, 379 A.2d 419, 421 (1977), cert. denied, 282 Md. 729 (1978) (same); Coleman
v. State, 37 Md. App. 322, 327-28, 329, 377 A.2d 553, 556-57 (1977) (criminal liability
for desertion and nonsupport may not be imposed only on men). But cf Lucado v. State,
40 Md. App. 25, 40, 389 A.2d 398, 406-07 (1978) (character evidence of chastity does
not include nonhomosexuality).
179. See Key to Successful Sex Discrimination Litigation, supra note 152, at 257; State Path-
ways, supra note 149, at 135; Eight Years of Application, supra note 173, at 353; ERA IMPACT
PROJECT, supra note 173, at 3; cf Linde, supra note 150, at 391 (Maryland ERA mandates
more strict analysis than federal equal protection clause); Rees, supra note 159, at 318
(Maryland ERA requires strict equality between the sexes in classifications).
There was some difference of opinion among members of the court regarding rem-
edies for the constitutional violation. The majority consistently limited itself to striking
down provisions that violated the ERA. In dealing with a law that unconstitutionally
favored one sex over the other, however, at least one member of the court would have
extended the benefits to the disfavored sex, rather than striking down the provision
reflexively. In Condore, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011, Judge Rodowsky dissented from
the court's holding which struck down the common-law doctrine of necessaries as ap-
plied against husbands, rather than extend its benefits to wives. Id. at 533, 425 A.2d at
1019. He would have extended the doctrine of necessaries to credit-worthy women. Id.
at 543, 425 A.2d at 1024-25. The court of special appeals also would apply the option of
extending the "benefits" to the disfavored sex in the case of common-law alimony. See
Hofmann, 50 Md. App. at 244, 437 A.2d at 249 (common-law alimony, when ordered by
the court, was not eliminated with regard to the husband with the advent of the ERA;
instead, the duty was added to the wife).
180. 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985).
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or law which, though facially neutral, produced discriminatory ef-
fects. In Burning' Tree the court was faced with a statutory provision
enacted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, but which
exempted private, single-sex clubs from its protection. In a split de-
cision, the court of appeals held that the country club exemption
violated the Maryland ERA and struck down the entire statute be-
cause the exemption was not severable.
Burning Tree involved the challenge of a 1965 statute that au-
thorized the State to enter into agreements with private country
clubs for the purpose of granting tax deferrals in return for guaran-
tees that open spaces on club property would be preserved for ten
years.' In 1974 an anti-discrimination provision to the statute was
enacted, with a saving clause which exempted application of the
anti-discrimination requirement from any club whose primary pur-
pose was to serve or benefit members of a particular sex.' 8 2 As a
result, the -l-male Burning Tree Club (Burning Tree) was the Only
club in Maryland to benefit from the tax advantage while discrimi-
nating against women. The tax advantage to Burning Tree in 1981
involved a savings of approximately $130,000.00. There were no
all-female clubs in Maryland that could take advantage of the stat-
ute's preferential tax treatment. The court below held that the pri-
mary purpose provision of the statute violated the Maryland ERA.
By granting favorable tax treatment to a club that discriminated
against one sex, the statute defeated the purpose and spirit of the
ERA, necessarily disfavored the sex excluded from club member-
ship, and "'impermissibly made gender a distinguishing
characteristic.' "183
Skirting around the Rand absolute standard against sex-based
181. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e)(4) (1980).
182. The anti-discrimination amendment and the primary purpose provision, as it has
become known, read in pertinent part:
In order to qualify under this section, the club may not practice or allow to be
practiced any form of discrimination in granting membership or guest privi-
leges based upon the race, color, creed, sex, or national origin of any person or
persons. The determination as to whether or not any club practices discrimina-
tion shall be made by the Office of the Attorney General after affording a hear-
ing to the club. The provisions of this section with respect to discrimination in sex do not
apply to any club whose facilities are operated with the primary purpose, as determined by
the Attorney General, to serve or benefit members of a particular sex, nor to the clubs which
exclude certain sexes only on certain days and at certain times. If the Attorney General
determines that a pattern of discrimination is evident in any club, he shall nego-
tiate a consent agreement with that club to cease such discrimination.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e)(4)(i) (1980) (emphasis of primary purpose provision
added).
183. Burning Tree, 305 Md. at 61, 501 A.2d at 821.
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classifications, the court split into two factions on its interpretation
of the Maryland ERA. The faction led by Chief Judge Murphy
would apply the Maryland ERA prohibition against classifications
based on sex only if the effects of the law would result in unequal
rights between women and men. 84 Thus, a classification based on
gender per se would not trigger the protection of the ERA unless
"all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and responsibilities of
citizens" were apportioned unequally between the sexes. 8 5 In such
instances, Chief Judge Murphy would apply the Rand absolute
standard.
The faction led by Judge Eldridge, on the other hand, would
scrutinize gender-based classifications per se under ERA analysis.' 86
A gender-neutral law whose effects differentiate between women
and men also would trigger constitutional scrutiny. 8 7- Instead of
the Rand absolute standard, however, Judge Eldridge would apply
an "at least strict scrutiny" standard, both to gender-based classifi-
cations and to gender-neutral laws having effects that differentiate
between women and men.18 8
Chief Judge Murphy, joined by Judges Orth and Smith, was in
the minority in upholding the constitutionality of the primary pur-
pose provision. The minority found that the statute in Burning Tree
was facially neutral because the preferential tax treatment was avail-
able to both all-male and all-female clubs. Chief Judge Murphy held
that there was no unequal treatment in the classification.' 89 In ana-
lyzing whether the facially neutral statute produced unconstitutional
discriminatory effects, Chief Judge Murphy held that, contrary to
the claims of the appellees, the preferential tax scheme did not con-
stitute encouragement, support or financial aid to the discriminatory
184. Id. at 70-71, 501 A.2d at 825-26. The court in Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 512,
374 A.2d 900, 903 (1977), had adopted an absolute bar on the use of sex-based classifi-
cations per se.
185. Burning Tree, 305 Md. at 70-71, 501 A.2d at 825-26.
186. Id. at 95-96, 501 A.2d at 838-39.
187. Id. at 100-02, 501 A.2d at 841-42.
188. Id at 96, 98, 501 A.2d at 839, 840. Interestingly, in support of his "at least strict
scrutiny" standard in cases involving discriminatory classifications under the ERA, Judge
Eldridge relied on Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312
A.2d 216 (1973) and Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977). In effect, he
combined the suggestion in Kuhn that a strict scrutiny standard should apply to discrimi-
nation based on sex, 270 Md. at 506-07, 312 A.2d at 222, with the Rand holding that
classifications based on sex violate the ERA, 280 Md. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903. Yet Kuhn,
which came four years before Rand, never reached the ERA issue; and the holding in
Rand was based directly on the ERA, but adopted an absolute standard.
189. Burning Tree, 305 Md. at 70-71, 501 A.2d at 826.
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policies of Burning Tree.' 90 He observed that claims of sex discrim-
ination under the ERA must be based generally on state action and
that the discriminatory policies of Burning Tree were not attributa-
ble to the State.19" ' He concluded that at worst the State by its ac-
quiescence was indifferent to Burning Tree's discriminatory
policies.' 9 In any event, the fact that there were no all-female
country clubs to benefit from the statute's provisions was not attrib-
utable to a statutory purpose.
193
Judge Eldridge, joined by Judges Cole and Bloom, concurred in
the majority holding that the primary purpose provision violates the
Maryland ERA and dissented from Chief Judge Murphy's entire
analysis.' 9 4 The statute was enacted to prohibit discrimination, but
exempted sex discrimination when it is the primary purpose of a
club. Thus, Judge Eldridge found that the statute expressly drew a
classification based on gender. The classification, and the enforce-
ment machinery established by the statute, sufficiently involved the
State in the Burning Tree's discriminatory practices. 95 Judge El-
dridge refused to limit the protection of the ERA to classifications
that produced discriminatory effects, as Chief Judge Murphy would
190. In support of his conclusion, Chief Judge Murphy noted that the State did not
initiate or cause the discriminatory policy of Burning Tree, the purpose of the statute,
i.e., to preserve open spaces, had no relation to sex discrimination, and Burning Tree's
tax benefit would not be lost if it chose to admit women as members.. Id. at 75-76, 501
A.2d at 828. As Judge Eldridge noted in his dissent, however, the statutory provision
being challenged in Burning Tree was not the open space/tax preference provision but
the anti-discrimination exemption provision. Id. at 102, 501 A.2d at 842.
191. See discussion on a state action requirement, infra p..
192. 305 Md. at 76, 501 A.2d at 828.
193. Id. at 78-79, 501 A.2d at 830. ChiefJudge Murphy referred to Personnel Adm'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), to point out that a discriminatory effect of the Burning
Tree statute-that only all-male Burning Tree benefited from the statute-was not a pur-
pose of the statute. Feeney involved a challenge to a Massachusetts veterans' preference
statute which, it was alleged, had a disproportionate adverse effect on women; only men
benefited firom its provisions. The Supreme Court held that, under equal protection
analysis, a facially neutral statute that adversely affects women must be shown to have
such an adverse effect as its purpose. That is, it must be shown that the state action (a
statute that has disparate impact on women) is taken "at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279. In Feeney,
the fact that the vast majority of veterans were men was not due to the preference stat-
ute, Judge Murphy noted, and so the statute was not unconstitutional under the four-
teenth amendment. 305 Md. at 78-79, 501 A.2d at 830. In Burning Tree, the disparity
between all-female and all-male clubs also evolved independently of the statute's provi-
sions, in the Chief Judge's analysis. Id.
194. Finding the primary purpose provision of the statute not severable, Judge El-
dridge's faction would have upheld the statute and struck down only the country club
exemption. 305 Md. at 91, 501 A.2d at 836.
195. Id. at 92-93. 501 A.2d at 837.
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hold. Instead, as in Rand, he would invoke ERA review whenever
gender is used as a classification factor, whether per se or through
the classification's effects.
Judge Eldridge, however, adopted an "at least strict scrutiny"
standard to test gender-based classifications under the ERA.' 96
Under this standard, a classification based on sex is not absolutely
prohibited. Such a classification could be justified if designed to
meet a compelling state interest.' 97 Under certain circumstances,
therefore, sex-based classifications could survive ERA strict scru-
tiny. For example, as Judge Eldridge noted, inherent differences be-
tween the sexes might justify separate restroom or locker room
facilities.' 98 Because Burning Tree offered no evidence orjustifica-
tion of a compelling state interest in maintaining the gender-based
classification of the primary purpose provision, the provision failed
strict scrutiny. Judge Eldridge found that the purpose and effect of
the-primary purpose provision of the statute was to permit Burning
Tree to maintain a discriminatory policy while receiving a substan-
tial state subsidy.' 99
Judge Rodowsky concurred with the majority, holding that the
statute was unconstitutionally discriminatory on its face. 20 0  He
found that enactment of the primary purpose provision constituted
sufficient state action to trigger ERA protection. He reasoned that
even though the statute did not specify which sex Was to be ac-
corded different burdens or benefits, the terms of the statute always
would apply to a particular sex, the one excluded by a single-sex
club. Thus, the statute differentiated in its anti-discrimination pro-
tections on the basis of gender. Judge Rodowsky did not specify
whether he would apply an absolute or a strict scrutiny standard to
his finding. He concluded, however, that the ERA "prevents the
General Assembly from conferring lesser benefits on persons who
196. Id.
197. Id. at 96, 501 A.2d at 839.
198. 305 Md. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840.
199. Id. at 101, 501 A.2d at 841. Judge Eldridge found that the primary purpose
provision, not the entire statute, was directed only at Burning Tree and therefore was
enacted with the sole purpose of benefiting that club. He observed that, unlike the Burn-
ing Tree primary purpose provision, the purpose of the statute in Feeney was not to sanc-
tion discrimination against women, and the sole beneficiaries there were not only men.
Id. at 100-01, 501 A.2d at 841.
200. Because he held that the provision was not severable from the rest of the statute,
Judge Rodowsky was a part of the two separate majorities in the case: one holding the
primary purpose provision unconstitutional and the other holding the provision not sev-
erable from the statute. Id. at 85-88, 501 A.2d at 833-35.
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are objects of sex-based discrimination."' 0 '
2. Standard of Review After Burning Tree.-The majority in Burn-
ing Tree would hold that a statute or other state action which, on its
face or in its effects, differentiates on the basis of sex in the distribu-
tion of its benefits or. burdens, irrespective of whether one or the
other sex is specified, violates the Maryland ERA. One faction of
the court would apply an absolute prohibition to such a situation,
and another faction would apply an "at least strict scrutiny" stan-
dard. The swing vote, Judge Rodowsky, has not specified which
standard he would apply.
Under Judge Eldridge's "at least strict scrutiny" standard, a
statute or other state action would undergo a scrutiny that would, as
in cases of racial discrimination, permit the use of gender as a differ-
entiating classification to meet a compelling state interest. 2 2 The
deviation from an absolute standard to a strict scrutiny standard is
not warranted. The premise of an ERA is that "sex is not a permis-
sible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men." '20 3
Because of the danger of over- or underinclusiveness of individuals
when classifications are based on sex, and because there are dangers
in applying so-called objective bases upon which to differentiate in
establishing rights and responsibilities between women and men,
the court should retain the absolute standard in cases of sex discrim-
ination brought under the ERA. Of course, laws based on physical
characteristics would survive analysis under an absolute standard
because the basis for differentiating would not be the sex of the indi-
vidual, but a physical characteristic possessed by only one sex.20 4
201. Id. at 88, 501 A.2d at 834.
202. 305 Md. at 98, 102, 501 A.2d at 840, 842.
203. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 155, at 889.
204. The court in Burning Tree recognized this. ChiefJudge Murphy noted that dispa-
rate treatment under the terms of a law is permissible when on account of physical char-
acteristics unique to one sex. 305 Md. at 64 n.3, 501 A.2d at 822 n.3. Under Judge
Eldridge's analysis some very few classifications may survive strict scrutiny-classifica-
tions based on "the inherent differences between the sexes." Id. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840.
Separate restroom or locker room facilities are cited by the Judge as examples of such
permissible classifications. While ChiefJudge Murphy's exception is limited to physical
characteristics, Judge Eldridge's exception for "inherent differences" opens the door to
existing and potential stereotyping that are couched in terms of "inherent differences."
Therefore, any exception to the absolute protection of equal rights for women and men
should be strictly limited to exceptions based on physical differences rather than socio-
logical or other theoretical bases. The exceptions for physical differences are more lim-
ited than many may think. For exampleJudge Eldridge's cited examples perhaps would
be more appropriate for exception under the right of privacy than the perceived inher-
ent differences between the sexes. In cases of sexual offenses, the incorporation of an
element of genital contact rather than vaginal intercourse would make the crime applica-
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It is not clear whether the majority would require that the dis-
criminatory effects of the statute or other state action be purposeful.
Chief Judge Murphy and judge Eldridge addressed the issue in
Burning Tree, but each arrived at different conclusions. ChiefJudge
Murphy would require a "causal connection between the state ac-
tion and the discrimination. "025 judge Eldridge responded to the
Chief Judge's finding without expressly adopting the causation re-
quirement. On the other hand, he found that it would be appropri-
ate to "determine the existence of a discriminatory purpose and
impact. ' 0 6 It would seem, therefore, that the court might require a
showing that a statute have a discriminatory effect as its purpose.20 7
An additional requirement of a showing of purposeful discrimina-
tion, however, is neither appropriate nor necessary under an ERA
analysis.
The implications created by a popular amendment to the state
constitution do not support the requirement of purposeful discrimi-
nation. In adopting an ERA to the state constitution, and also in
ratifying the ERA to the United States Constitution, the citizens and
legislators of Maryland embraced a profound value, namely, that the
equal rights of women and men should receive the supreme protec-
tion of both Constitutions. This elevates the equal rights policy be-
yond the level of comparability with other rights available under
statute or common law. It is a recognition that equal rights between
women and men permit no excuse or justification for their abridge-
ment or denial. The court should adopt standards for state action
consistent with the line of cases interpreting the court's standard of
review under the ERA. "[T]he E.R.A. flatly prohibits gender-based
classifications .. .in the allocation of benefits, burdens, rights and
responsibilities as between men and women.1 20 8
An additional reason why purposeful discrimination is not nec-
essary under ERA analysis is because of the special position the ERA
holds relative to federal decisions on the subject. A state court, in
interpreting its constitution, is not obligated to adopt federal consti-
tutional standards or principles, especially when the state constitu-
tion is unique in its provision and still undergoing primary analyses
ble to both sexes, thereby eliminating another exception for physical difference from the
law.
205. Id. at 78, 501 A.2d at 829.
206. Id. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841.
207. Whether the discriminatory effect must be a sole purpose or one of several pur-
poses of the statute or other state action remains an open question.
208. 305 Md. at 64, 501 A.2d at 822.
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of the court. By adopting the ERA, the citizens of Maryland ex-
pressed an intent to surpass the protections of the United States
Constitution in the realm of equal rights for women and men. If the
purposeful discrimination requirement applied by federal courts in
equal protection analysis 20 9 were applied by the state court, the goal
of the ERA would be hindered. By importing principles that apply
to dissimilar federal constitutional provisions, the essence and in-
tent of the ERA are weakened.
C. State Action
The court seems unanimous in imposing a state action require-
ment for ERA analysis. It is not self-evident, however, that the
Maryland ERA requires state action for its application. The ERA re-
fers to "[e]quality of rights under the law." There is nothing in that
language that necessitates a state action requirement. The phrase
"under the law" means no more than that a right or claim is derived
from a constitution, statutes or decisional laws, or is claimed as a
result of long usage. Rights derived from the law include private
rights between private individuals, such as the right not to be de-
frauded or not to be libeled. Therefore; logic dictates that the
phrase "under the law" is intended to mean equality of rights avail-
able under the law.
The proposed federal ERA requires state action by its terms:
the federal ERA commands that equality of rights shall not be
abridged or denied "by the United States or by any state." No such
qualification appears in the Maryland ERA.
Although the Attorney General has "consistently viewed' the
words 'under the law' as indicating that the constitutional prohibi-
tion applies only to (i) governmental entities and (ii) private organi-
zations affected by 'state action,' 20 those opinions have been
based on nothing more than a 1978 Attorney General's opinion
which concluded without discussion or legal foundation that such
was the case.2 ' There is no Maryland legal analysis that supports a
requirement of state action under the Maryland ERA.2 12
209. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
210. 68 Op. Att'y Gen. (Md.) 173, 177 (1983).
211. 63 Op. Att'y Gen. (Md.) 246, 250 (1978).
212. For a discussion of state action requirements in other jurisdictions, see Key to
Successful Sex Discrimination Litigation, supra note 152, at 261-62; State Pathways, supra note
149, at 122-26.
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V. COMPARABLE WORTH UNDER THE MARYLAND ERA
A comparable worth, gender-based wage discrimination suit
can be brought in Maryland under Maryland's ERA.
A. Gender-Based Wage Discrimination
The state compensation system, known as the merit system, is
established by statute 213 and is administered by the Secretary of Per-
sonnel, who "shall . . . make such rules as he deems necessary or
proper" to implement the pay plan.2 t4 Under the rules promul-
gated by the Secretary, the various job classifications in the merit
system, including the female- and male-dominated job classes, are
evaluated and assigned rates of pay.
On its face, this classification and compensation scheme, along
with the evaluation systems used to implement and maintain it, is
neutral. The merit system statute requires the Secretary of Person-
nel "to prepare and recommend . . . a pay plan for all classes of
positions" without indication that gender is to be a factor in the pro-
cess.2 1 1 While the statute does not explicitly require that men and
women be classified and compensated differently, it does discrimi-
nate against female-dominated job classes by undervaluing their
jobs.
The Governor's Commission studied the current job evaluation
and ranking systems used by the State.21 6 In analyzing the current
evaluation system, the Study compared the rates of pay of selected
female-dominated job classes with the rates of pay of selected male-
dominated job classes under the current system. The consultants
213. MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 27 (1983 & Supp. 1986). The pertinent section regu-
lating compensation states:
(a) Establishing and recommending pay plan.-After consultation with' ap-
pointing authorities, the Secretary of Personnel shall prepare and recommend
to the Governor a pay plan for all classes of positions in both the classified and
unclassified service to the end that all positions in the service involving compa-
rable duties, experience, responsibilities and authority shall be paid compara-
ble salaries in accordance with the relative value of the service to be performed.
In establishing rates of pay, the Secretary shall give consideration to experi-
ence, the prevailing rates of pay for the services performed, and for comparable
services in public and private employment, living costs, maintenance or other
benefits received by employees, and the state's financial condition and policies.
The pay plan shall take effect and shall have the force and effect of law after
approval by the Governor.
Id. § 27(a).
214. Id. § 11.
215. See supra note 213.
216. See Study, supra note 26.
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re-evaluated the current classes under an evaluation system that
removes gender as a possible variable and restricts the valuation
process to factors grouped under the categories of skill, effort,
working conditions, and responsibility. 21 7
When the consultants eliminated gender from consideration in
the evaluation process, the pay levels for jobs of equal skill, effort,
working conditions and responsibility, as measured by assigned
point values rating the major factors, should have been equal. The
Study found that such was not the case. When gender was elimi-
nated and other variables remained equal, the rates of pay of fe-
male-dominated job classes were from three percent to twenty
percent lower than the rates of pay of male-dominated job
classes. 21 8 Gender was the variable which determined the difference
in rates of pay. Thus, the Study indicated that compensation under
the merit system differentiated according to the gender of the em-
ployees being paid.
The gender-based wage discrimination in the state compensa-
tion scheme, as detected by the results of the Study, has not
changed since the Study was conducted. The effect of a one-time
pay raise directed at undervalued, female-dominated job +classifica-
tions was erased the following two years when the remainder ofjob
classifications in the system received comparable pay increases. No
steps have been taken to revise the compensation scheme in order
to eliminate- the gender-based wage disparities.
The differential in pay under the current pay plan impos es bur-
dens and benefits unequally on the basis of sex. 219 The female-
dominated classes of state employees receive from three percent to
twenty percent less pay than the male-dominated classes for work
that is comparable on the basis of recognized evaluation factors.2 2 °
Adjustment of the discrepancy for workweek hours, especially when
based upon a salary scale that reflected a one-time wage increase
that was erased the following year, does not mitigate or justify the
217. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
219. There is dispersion within each of the gender-dominated classes. Within the fe-
male-dominated and male-dominated job categories, individual job classes that shared
the same point value had pay rates that varied from $0 to $6,259. Study, supra note 26,
at IV-49. That is, within the female-dominated classes and the male-dominated classes,
some jobs are undervalued to a greater extent than others. The dispersion does not
diminish the impact of the documented disparity between female-dominated and male-
dominated job classifications. It highlights the irrationality of the current job evaluation.
system.
220. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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wage disparity. 22 1 Under the more restrictive court of appeals inter-
pretation, a facially neutral classification scheme that imposes differ-
ent burdens and benefits on the basis of sex constitutes gender-
based discrimination which triggers review under the Maryland
ERA.222
B. Subjective and Discriminatory Job Evaluation System
The present job evaluation system was established in 1971.
Evaluation ofjobs in the classification system is conducted by means
of a "whole job" factor comparison ranking technique.223 Evalua-
tion under this method begins by selecting certain key jobs, evaluat-
ing them according to selected factors, then rank ordering the
remaining jobs in relation to the key jobs. However, if the key jobs
that are utilized are only male-dominated jobs, and the factors mak-
ing up the job content are those occurring most frequently in male-
dominated jobs, then female-dominated jobs will be comparatively
undervalued because they lack the qualities male-dominated jobs
are perceived to possess. In addition, if the key jobs are themselves
overvalued, the valuation of female-dominated jobs in comparison
may be lower to an even greater proportion.
This system, according to the Study, "tends to rely extensively
on subjective judgments. ' 224 When jobs are evaluated subjectively,
bias and stereotypes have free rein. The discriminatory results evi-
dence the systemic undervaluation of female-dominated jobs docu-
mented by the Study.
As noted by the Study, when systemic undervaluation ofjobs is
found, one way to address the problem is to examine the job evalua-
tion system. 2 5 The consultants suggested that in order to address
the subjectivity of the current evaluation system-which the Study
considers a single system-a committee be formed to make the com-
parisons of the key jobs, making sure that women members be on
the committee, and that the average of their ratings be used. 228
There are no indications that the State has implemented this sug-
gestion to remedy the subjective evaluation system.
221. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
224. Study, supra note 26, at V-22.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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C. Knowing Utilization of Discriminatory Market 'age
When demonstrated to have an adverse effect on female-domi-
nated jobs, failure to correct disparities that are related to the
State's reliance on the market for wage-setting data unconstitution-
ally violates the equal rights of the women and men in those job
classes. The statute governing the pay plan for job classes in the
state personnel system 227 requires the Secretary to "give considera-
tion to experience, the prevailing rates of pay for the services per-
formed, and for comparable services in public and private
employment .... "' When the State relies on the market for data
upon which to base salary schedules, however, the discriminatory
bias of the market is imported into the state compensation
system.229
This absorption of market wage bias was highlighted in the
Study.230 A wage survey that is regularly used by the State to deter-
mine benchmark classes for revision of salary schedules was tested
against a system that evaluates jobs solely on the basis of content
(i.e., not using gender as a factor) and was shown to import a gen-
der-based wage disparity of 6.8 percent. The results of the test
demonstrated that reliance upon the market introduces into the
state compensation system discriminatory pay levels for jobs valued
equally by work content. Knowing that such reliance adversely in-
fluences female-dominated job classes, the State is implicated in a
practice that is discriminatory to female-dominated job classes.
Reliance on the market by the State is unwarranted. The state
compensation system, to a certain extent, operates as an internal
labor market, producing applicants and candidates from within for
promotion into other pay classes. The State relies to a small extent
on the external market for applicants. If internal job promotions
have priority over external recruitment, and the percentage ofjobs
filled from within are significant, then reliance on the market is mis-
placed and unnecessary. In addition, the State dominates the entire
market of certain job classes so that the State itself effectively deter-
mines the wages of those jobs.231 If the State is the primary, if not
the sole, employer of social workers or librarians, for example, it is
hardly logical to rely on private market wage surveys for guidance
on setting wage levels. The State controls the wages of more than
227. MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 27(a) (1983 & Supp. 1986).
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. See Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 442.
230. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
231. AARON & LoUGY, supra note 4, at 39.
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55,000 individuals, 20,000 of whom are in the female-dominated of-
fice and clerical, health care and human services career fields. 32
There is a clear probability that the State dominates the market in
those areas.
The State has failed to supplement the marketplace's shortcom-
ings by augmenting the salaries of female-dominated classes to elim-
inate the market-based wage disparity. Further, cost is not a viable
defense against supplementing the marketplace wage to remedy
gender-based wage discrimination. 33  A priority on remedying
wage disparities in female-dominated jobs would require a reorder-
ing of budgetary priorities but not a decrease in the pay of other state
employees. More importantly, any amount necessary to remedy the
gender-based wage disparities is simply evidence of the extent to
which the State is being unjustly enriched. Cost savings at the ex-
pense of female-dominated job classes is hardly a sound policy ra-
tionale upon which to base a defense against gender-based wage
discrimination.
D. Job Segregation
The Study showed that women working in the state employ-
ment system are concentrated in a few, low-paying job classifica-
tions. 34 While the process of hiring, classifying and paying female
employees in the state employment system is supposed to be con-"
ducted on a basis which is not gender-based, it is clear that the pro-
cess generates a separation of the sexes in jobs. Because not all
women can be assumed to have chosen work in the lowest paying
jobs of the state system, at least some element of the segregation
may be evidence of action or actions on the part of the State-
through the application, testing, interviewing, counseling and as-
signment processes-to direct women into those low-paying jobs.
The Study based its conclusion that some women choose low-
paying jobs more than men upon a random sample survey. It did
not integrate into its analysis the societal influences at play in wo-
men's choices. Furthermore, the consultants noted the limits of
their ability to detect and analyze the long-term, subtle effects of
deliberate tracking. In contrast, studies by noted experts show that
job segregation is not necessarily the result of working women's free
232. Study, supra note 26, at VI-13, -18.
233. Reliance on the "going market rate" has been rejected out of hand as a defense
to cases brought under the EPA. See Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241
n.12 (5th Cir. 1973).
234. See supra notes 62-65 and accompan)ing text.
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choice as the Study's limited survey would imply.23 5 In any event,
the fact that women will accept less pay is not a basis for continuing
discrimination on the basis of sex. One cannot validly consent to be
discriminated against.2 36
E. Undervaluation of Female-Dominated Jobs is Unconstitutional Under
Either an Absolute or "At Least Strict Scrutiny" Standard
In scrutinizing the state action under an ERA analysis, the court
may apply an absolute standard or a standard based on "at least
strict scrutiny." Gender-based wage discrimination in the form of
undervaluation of female-dominated classes in the state compensa-
tion scheme is unconstitutional under this standard. Under the ab-
solute standard, the state compensation scheme that produces the
documented gender-based wage discrimination is prohibited point
blank. UnderJudge Eldridge's "at least strict scrutiny" standard,237
the compensation scheme that produces the gender-based wage dis-
parity fails review because it cannot be justified under any compel-
ling governmental interest. First, there is an easily available, less
discriminatory alternative compensation scheme. This scheme in-
volves a gender-neutral, point factor evaluation system which, when
adopted and implemented, would eliminate gender as a factor in
evaluation and would equalize pay scales for job classes dominated
by either females or males that are evaluated equally. Second, the
cost of implementing a system which does not differentiate on the
basis of sex is not a sufficient compelling state interest to justify re-
fusal to cure a known gender-based wage disparity.2 8 Finally, there
is no acceptable or justifiable compelling state policy which should
permit gender-based wage disparities to be perpetuated by the
State.
F. No Purposeful Discrimination Need be Shown
As discussed previously, 23 9 actions under the ERA should not
require a showing of purposeful discrimination before the ERA pro-
235. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
236. See Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973).
237. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
238. See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978) ("[N]either Con-
gress nor the courts have recognized [a cost-justification] defense under Title VII.");
Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1971) ("The sole
permissible reason for discriminating against actual or prospective employees involves
the individual's capability to perform the job effectively. This approach leaves no room
for arguments regarding inconvenience, annoyance or even expense to the employer.").
239. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
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tections can apply. In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,240 discussed
by Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree, a Massachusetts veteran
preference statute was challenged as having'a disproportionate ad-
verse impact on women. Ninety-eight percent of the veterans who
benefited from the preference in state employment were male. The
Supreme Court upheld the statutory preference, finding that the
legislative decision to confer a benefit on veterans was legitimate,
even though it inevitably meant that nonveterans would be denied
the benefit.2 4' The fact that women were effectively blocked from
competing for the jobs that veterans preferred was foreseeable, but
the statute was not enacted in order to have that consequence. The
state action implicated here-the undervaluation of female-domi-
nated job classifications under the current compensation system-is
known to produce the consequent gender-based wage disparity, as
documented by the Study. The inevitable disparity resulting from
the evaluation system is not legitimate. Conferring a comparative
wage benefit on male-dominated job classes is not a legitimate state
goal, such as might be the "perceived need to help . veterans."242
The state compensation system is not innocent. The comparative
benefit enjoyed by male-dominated classes is not a valid justification
for requiring more proof, under the ERA, than that the conse-
quences are apportioned unequally between the sexes.
The ERA, therefore, requires no more than a showing of dis-
criminatory effect, the unequal distribution of burdens and benefits
on the basis of sex. The ERA is unique to the State in comparison
to the United States Constitution or other federal statutes. It fo-
cuses on a specific area of equal rights, rather than on general equal-
ity principles. The spirit and force of the ERA are vulnerable to
erosion through the gradual limitation of its scope.
G. Purposeful Discrimination by the State of Maryland
Assuming arguendo that one must show intentionality or pur-
pose to support a claim of gender-based wage discrimination under
the ERA, there is nonetheless substantial evidence that the discrimi-
natory wage disparity evidenced in the Study and perpetuated by
the State's intentional failure to correct it, has "an unconstitution-
ally discriminatory purpose and effect."-243
240. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
241. Id. at 275.
242. Id. at 280.
243. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 71, 501 A.2d 817, 826 (1985).
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1. Failure to Remedy Discriminatory Wage Disparity.-The State
continues to utilize the existing pay plan and evaluation system de-
spite its demonstrated and known wage disparities between the fe-
male-dominated and male-dominated classes. As noted earlier, the
consultants presented a copy of. the results of the Study to the
Governor's Commission which, in turn, presented a copy to the
Governor.244 The Governor's Commission recommended that the
State adopt a point factor evaluation system because it "is a rela-
tively objective and rational method ... which assists in resolving a
number of compensation issues in addition to 'comparable
worth.' "245
The DOP, whose representative was a member of the
Governor's Commission, was kept apprised of the results at all
stages of the process. Since the February 1986 formal presentation
of the results of the Study, legislation has been proposed and hear-
ings have been held in an effort to prompt action to remedy the
wage disparities. The DOP was called upon to present fiscal data on
the cost of implementing a systemwide point factor evaluation sys-
tem for legislation which was introduced in 1986 and 1987.246 The
DOP was cited for its failure to take any serious.steps to implement
the recommendations of the Governor's Commission.247
The General Assembly also has been kept apprised of the re-
sults. of the Study. Several legislators were members of the
Governor's Commission. Three bills aimed at implementing a point
factor evaluation system-one of the Governor's Commission's four
recommendations to the Governor-have had hearings and full dis-
cussion. Yet the General Assembly failed to take notice and pass the
bills. The Subcommittee noted in its Interim Report that the 1986
ASR pay raises, discussed previously, "were made for the purpose
of attempting an affordable resolution of State salary inequities as evi-
denced by the findings/recommendations of the Sondheim Commission. "248
The State has continued to discriminate on the basis of sex by
undervaluing the female-dominated classes in its current compensa-
tion system despite all these warnings and opportunities.
244. See Study, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 77.
246. See Department of Personnel, Fiscal Note, H.B. 1461, 1986 Sess.; Department of
Personnel, Fiscal Note, H.B. 1067, 1987 Sess.
247. See Comments, supra note 105.
248. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 106, at 39 (emphasis added).
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2. Adjustment for Workweek Hours.-The manipulation of the re-
sults of the Study by adjusting workweek hours in order to diminish
the impact of the wage disparity in female-dominated positions is
neitherjustified nor appropriate. As discussed earlier,249 the adjust-
ment was based on an inappropriate salary level; the number of
hours worked per week are not related to the salary established for a
full-time job; workweek hours are fungible factors in relation to sala-
ries; and finally, employees have no control over workweek hours,
making it a working condition of the job rather than a variable for
determination of wages. Thus, the State may not rely on the adjust-
ment for workweek hours as counter-evidence that statistically insig-
nificant wage disparities exist between female-dominated and male-
dominated classifications in the state merit system. In addition, the
State may not rely on this adjustment to justify a failure to remedy
the documented gender-based wage disparities.
3. Job Segregation.-The results of the Study regarding job seg-
regation prompted recommendations by both the consultants and
the Governor's Commission to address the problem of female domi-
nation in low-paying job classifications. Steps in that direction have
not been taken by the DOP.2 50
H. State Action Requirement
The logic and reasoning of the arguments of this comment re-
garding a state action requirement notwithstanding, in order to
meet the Maryland Court of Appeals' requirement of state action,251
two state actors clearly are responsible for the unconstitutional gen-
der-based wage discrimination discussed herein: (1) the Secretary
of Personnel, who is responsible for establishing and implementing
the classification and compensation system and (2) the General As-
sembly, who is on notice as to the need to cure the known wage
disparities.
VI. COMPARABLE WORTH CASES UNDER STATE LAW
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
To date there have been only a few cases alleging gender-based
wage discrimination on the basis of comparable worth that have
been brought solely under provisions of state law. In Alaska State
249. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
251. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 73, 86, 90 n.3, 501 A.2d 817,
827, 833-34, 836 n.3 (1985).
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Commission for Human Rights v. State25 2 the State Commission for
Human Rights (CHR) ruled in favor of a class of public health
nurses and granted them back pay in the first state agency-level rul-
ing under a comparable worth equal pay act. The CHR held on No-
vember 15, 1985, that the state employment classification system
violated Alaska's fair employment practices law which requires equal
pay for "work of comparable character" performed by members of
each sex because the predominantly female public health nurses
were paid less than an all-male crew of physicians' assistants for
work of comparable character.253
The CHR rejected the decision of the hearing examiner that
work of comparable character is intended to cover only jobs that are
the same or'substantially similar. The CHR reversed the hearing
examiner based on (1) its reading of personnel statutes to require
that the state "achieve an equitable internal relationship" among
employee salaries; 254 (2) construction of the language of title 18 of
the state code so as not to render the "comparable character"'
phrase superfluous; 255 and (3) a "pronounced intention" of the leg-
islature to remedy sex discrimination by passage of the state's ERA
and imbuing a "strong remedial purpose" in the state's anti-dis-
crimination law.256 The CHR also noted that federal law authorizes
states to enact broader standards prohibiting sex-based discrimina-
252. No. D-79-0724 188-E-E (Nov. 15, 1985), reported in 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1142, at 1737 (Dec. 9, 1985).
253. Id. Under the "Unlawful Employment Practices" section of the "Health and
Safety" title, the state may not "discriminate in the payment of wages as between the
sexes, or... employ a female in an occupation.., at a salary or wage rate less than that
paid to a male employeefor work of comparable character or work in the same operation,
business or type of work in the same locality." ALAsKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (1986)
(emphasis added).
Alaska does have an ERA, ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 3, which prohibits the denial of
civil rights on the basis of sex (among other things), but it was not a basis for the suit in
this case.
254. It is not clear from the report to which personnel statutes the Commission for
Human Rights (CHR) was referring. Title 39, "Public Officers and Employees," re-
quires, under the Scope of the Rules Section, that the annual pay plan established by the
director of personnel "provide for fair and reasonable compensation for services ren-
dered, and reflect the principle of like pay for like work." ALAsKA STAT. § 39.25.150
(1984). Under the Preparation and Submission of Pay Schedules Section, the director of
personnel must establish an annual pay plan which takes into account "the statistics and
reasonable internal pay relationships." ALAsKA STAT. § 39.27.035 (1984). The CHR
also may have relied on personnel regulations.
255. If "comparable character" were to apply only to the same or substantially similar
jobs, the second half of the sentence prohibiting underpayment for "work in the same
operation, business or type of work in the same locality" would be meaningless. 23
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1142, at 1738.
256. Id.
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tion than those used in the application of the federal EPA. Female
employees must be paid equally for work "which is of comparable
value to the employer in terms of the composite skill, responsibility,
efforts, and working conditions of the positions." '257
The CHR also refused the market defense to the wage dispari-
ties, finding that reliance on the market is "not appropriate" under
the "broad remedial purpose" of title 18 which, when read in tan-
dem with the state personnel statutes, requires evaluations to be
conducted using a "nonmarket based approach." '258 Moreover, reli-
ance on the market is particularly inappropriate in Alaska, where the
state is the largest employer and can influence the market wages.259
The state has appealed the ruling.26 °
Alaska's fair employment practices law approaches a true com-
parable worth statute: there is no qualification or condition in the
language requiring equal pay for work of "comparable character."
The key word is "comparable" which, as the court noted, permits
comparison on the basis of the evaluated worth of jobs. Thus the
court conducted its own comparable worth analysis of the two job
classifications. Although the state's annual salary survey is sup-
posed to reflect the competitive position of the state vis-i-vis the
private sector and other governmental agencies in that and neigh-
boring states,2 6' the pay schedule itself must consider "reasonable
internal pay relationships. ' 262 This would support the court's rejec-
tion of reliance on the market as the primary defense.
Service Employees' International Union v. County of Los Angeles 2 63. is a
class action suit that was filed against Los Angeles County under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act.2" Filed in June
1986, the plaintiff class alleged "rampant intentional discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, and national origin in wages and promo-
tions." 26 5 The first comparable worth suit filed under state law to
charge sex- and race-based wage discrimination, the allegations are
based upon information reported in a "preliminary report" con-
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1142, at 1738.
260. Reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at A-6 (Feb. 24, 1986). The report did
not specify on what basis the appeal was taken.
261. AL.%SKA STAT. § 39.27.030(a)(2) (1984).
262. See supra note 129.
263. No. 000985 (Super. Ct. filed June 13, 1986), reported in 24 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1169, at 883 (June 23, 1986).
264. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
265. Id.
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ducted by the union in 1984.266 The discrimination includes segre-
gation of Women and minorities in low-paying jobs, denial of equal
opportunity in transfer and promotions, and undercompensation
for "work actually performed," all of which "establish a pattern and
practice of deliberate and overt discrimination" by the county.267
The Fair Employment and Housing Act, like Title VII, has lan-
guage that prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
sex (among other bases), and thus, the court may adopt federal Title
VII principles in 'analyzing the case. California does not have an
ERA, so that an alternative litigation route is not available.
In Treva Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp.,268 the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a comparable-
worth suit brought under a state statute governing unfair discrimi-
natory practices in employment.2 69 The suit was brought by a fe-
male employee of a wholesale grocery plant alleging that the wages
of female clerical workers were undervalued in relation to the wages
of male workers in the physical plant. The state statute under which
the suit was filed 27 tracks Title VII rather closely, and the Minne-
sota courts use principles established in decisions under Title VII to
construe its application. Thus, the defense of reliance on the mar-
ket wage proved effective. 71 Minnesota, like California, does not
have an ERA, so litigation under that strategy was precluded.
VII. CONCLUSION
Comparable worth is alive and well and available under state
law to remedy gender-based wage discrimination. It fills the gap
where federal law and other state anti-discrimination laws fail to re-
spond in claims of unequal pay for work of comparable value to the
employer. The State of Maryland has documented substantial un-
dervaluation of female-dominated jobs relative to male-dominated
jobs in the state compensation system. Efforts to goad the State into
action to remedy the wage disparity have failed thus far.
The Maryland ERA provides a unique and powerful tool with
which to enforce pay equity rights. It reflects the superior value the
266. Id.
267. In preparation for filing suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs
filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in
April 1985. Reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 82, at A-3 (Apr. 29, 1985).
268. 370 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1985).
269. Id. at 908.
270. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, Subdiv. 1(2)(c) (West 1966 & Supp. 1987).
271. 370 N.W.2d at 908.
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citizenry has placed on equal rights for women and men. It de-
mands a standard of review independent of the legal analyses of the
federal courts. It provides the courts with an intelligent and practi-
cal foundation upon which to rely in crafting a remedy to gender-
based wage discrimination.
Under the latest interpretation of the ERA by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, whether applying an absolute or a strict scrutiny
standard of review, the gender-based wage discrimination evi-
denced by the Study violates the ERA. Although purposeful dis-
crimination need not be proved under the ERA when there is proof
that the benefits and burdens of state action are distributed differ-
ently between women and men, there is nevertheless substantial evi-
dence that will support an inference of purposeful discrimination.
Wage discrimination based on gender need not continue in
Maryland. The Maryland ERA prohibits paying persons who hold
jobs in female-dominated classes less than persons who hold jobs in
male-dominated classes when thejobs in both categories are compa-
rable in value.
AWILDA R. MARQUEZ*
* This comment earned the author the University of Maryland School of Law's
Joseph Bernstein Prize in May 1988.
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